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Peace Operations

- Supporting Efficiency by Organization -

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Peace Operations - Supporting Efficiency by Organization

Kalle Kallio
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Peace Operations - Supporting Efficiency by Organization

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The inefficiency of peace operations is broadly recognized. One crucial aspect is to develop interaction between stakeholders. This thesis studies the interaction through a generic peace operation's organization. IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities in European Union conflict prevention) project personnel from Laurea and Fincent have participated in defining the objectives for the thesis.

The main objective was to find out the possibilities to support the interaction through organization and develop a model which inhols the suggested ideas. This thesis was conducted as a survey study. The study examined the development of peace operations, their success factors, organization theories' applicability into operations and stakeholders and their capability to affect the operation.

The data collection was done by theory review, survey and interviews. The theory sections include mostly published and peer reviewed articles. The survey's respondents were selected based on their extensive experience in the subject. The interviews were used to evaluate the results and the conclusion.

The data was analyzed by content analysis: firstly, by qualitative content theming and combining and secondly by content isolation. A part of the survey was analyzed by statistical methods to develop a description of the situation.

It is important that the organization evolves in reaction to the changes in the environment and the situation. The structure itself is less important and should be based on the need. Core stakeholders should be present in as many levels as possible to support the overall understanding of the strategic objectives. It can be argued that the closer to the root level the stakeholders are operating, the more the operation's organization is to be based on self-emerging and voluntary based communities and networks.

Improving the information flow was recognized to be a factor enhancing the will to cooperate. This was followed by a need for a follow-up study examining the framework of the information flow and conceptualizing an information system for the operations.

The organization model produced has not been tested in practice and it cannot be directly adapted into any operation. Nevertheless, the ideas it inhols can be used in training and planning operations. The model's validity has been enhanced by peer reviews.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Organization, Cooperation, Stakeholder analysis, Interaction

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Rauhanturvaoperaatioiden tehokkuuden lisääminen organisaation näkökulmasta

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Rauhanturvaoperaatioiden tehokkuudessa koetaan olevan runsaasti parantamisen varaa. Yhtenä keskeisenä kehittämiskohteena on ryhmien välisen yhteistyön tehostaminen. Tässä opinnäytetyössä yhteistyötä on lähestytty yleisluontoisen operaation organisaatorakenteen kannalta. Tarkastelu keskittyy tunnistamaan rauhanturvaoperaatioiden keskeiset piirteet, niiden onnistumis- ja epäonnistumistekijät, yleisluontoiset sidosryhmät ja niiden vaikutuskyvyn operaation lopputulokseen. Opinnäytetyö on toteutettu yhteistyössä Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen keskuksen IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention) -projektin kanssa ja työn tavoitteet ovat osaltaan määräytyneet niiden pohjalta.

Työn tavoitteena on ollut selvittää organisatoriset mahdollisuudet tukea yleisluontoisen rauhanturvaoperaation sidosryhmien välistä yhteistyötä ja tuottaa näiden tekijöiden avulla yleinen malli organisaatiosta. Opinnäytetyö toteutettiin survey-tutkimuksena. Työssä selvitettiin miten rauhanturvaoperaatiot ovat kehittyneet, mitkä ovat onnistumisen edellytyksiä operaatioissa, mitkä organisaatioteorioiden teemat soveltuvat operaatioihin, mitä sidosryhmiä operaatioissa on ja miten ne kykenevät vaikuttamaan operaatioon.

Tiedonhankinnan keskeisiä menetelmiä ovat olleet teoriaan tutustuminen lähdeaineiston avulla ja kyselyn sekä haastattelujen tekeminen. Teoriaosuuksissa on käytetty pääosiltaan vertaisarvioituja artikkeleita. Kyselyihin valikoitui vastaajiksi laajasti aihepiiriä ymmärtäviä henkilöitä, joilla oli kokemusta sidosryhmien välisestä yhteistyöstä useista rauhanturvaoperaatioista. Haastatteluilla hankittiin vaihtoehtoisia mielipiteitä esitetyille johtopäätöksille.

Kerätty aineisto on analysoitu laadullisen sisällönanalyysin keinoin. Sisällönanalyysissä on käytetty sekä datan teemoittelua ja yhdistämistä että sisällön erittelyä. Osassa kyselyä on käytetty määrällisiä menetelmiä muodostamaan kuvaus tilanteesta.

Kehittämisehdotuksena on esitetty rauhanturvaoperaatioiden organisaatioiden rakentamista ympäristön ja tilanteen huomioiviksi, evoluutioon perustuviksi, joustaviksi kokonaisuuksiksi. Organisaation rakenteen tulee perustua tarpeeseen. Keskeiset sidosryhmät tulee osallistaa mahdollisimman monella tasolla operaation toimintaan. Tällä tuetaan strategisten tavoitteiden ymmärrystä läpi koko organisaation. Ruohonjuuritasolla organisaation tulee olla vapaaehtoisuuden ja itseorganisoinnin varaan rakentuvia verkostoja ja yhteisöjä. Tiedonkulun parantaminen tunnistettiin yhdeksi yhteistyöhalua lisääväksi tekijäksi. Yhtenä jatkotutkimustarpeena esitetään tiedonkulun viitekehysten analyysiä ja tietojärjestelmän konseptointia.

Tuotettua organisaatiomallia ei ole testattu käytännössä, eikä se sellaisenaan sovellu käytäntöön. Sen sisältämiä ideoita voidaan hyödyntää esimerkiksi koulutuksessa ja operaatioiden suunnittelussa. Mallin ideoiden luotettavuutta on parannettu antamalla kaikille kyselyyn vastanneille ja haastatelluille mahdollisuus kommentoida ideoita.

Asiasanat: Rauhanturvaaminen, Organisaatio, Sidosryhmäanalyysi, Yhteistyö, Vuorovaikutus
Ohjaaja: Seppo Leminen, Laurea

Executive summary

A comprehensive approach to peace operations is the most efficient known way to stabilize a war-torn country. Comprehensiveness means using all stakeholders and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives, which brings together the best capabilities of civilian and military components.

Many scholars mention that a lack of cooperation is causing ineffectiveness in operations. The objective of this thesis is to find organizational means to support the cooperation and to adapt the findings into a generic organization. The objective was developed by IECEU project's (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention project) content at Laurea University of Applied Sciences and the Finnish National Defence Forces' International Center.

This study approaches the objective through a generic operation. Comprehensiveness means cooperation between all the stakeholders acting in the area. The organization is a description of them. The study is not directed to any individual actor. The actors have been generalized and grouped into larger entities. Consequently, the developed model cannot be used as such but it can be adapted and utilized when developing a suitable model for a real situation.

This thesis is a survey study. The studied issues were the idea of comprehensiveness, the development of peace operations and their success factors, adopting organizational theories into peace operations and the stakeholders within peace operations and their ability to affect the outcome.

The data was collected by studying theory, conducting a survey and doing interviews. The theoretical part consists mainly of published peer-reviewed articles. The survey and interviews were utilized to fill the information gaps and to confirm theories' applicability to peace operations. The survey respondents and the interviewees had extensive experience on the top level of peace operations.

The data was mainly analyzed by content analysis and supported by statistical methods. The analyzing methods were qualitative content analysis and content isolation. Two survey rounds were numeric and were therefore analyzed by statistical methods.

The main findings are presented below.

Comprehensiveness Has Many Nicknames

Several international actors, such as the European Union and the United Nations, have recognized a need to act comprehensively to reach objectives. They tend to have different names for similar actions. Comprehensiveness has been described through terms such as

Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Missions and Whole-of-Government Approach. The terms are often used interchangeably, thus they all describe similar ideologies. In this thesis, comprehensiveness is understood to be today's way to approach peace operations. Therefore, the term *peace operation* is used.

Recognizing Stakeholders Is Essential in Comprehensive Actions

Several stakeholders are active in peace operations today. They must be recognized to have a theoretical possibility to enable objective-based actions. The recognition must be done as early as possible in the preparation and planning phase. This allows them to participate from the beginning. The stakeholders can be categorized for instance by activities, objectives, geographical area or governance level.

Even though each operation is unique, this thesis studied a generic operation. Therefore, twenty stakeholder groups were established and utilized in the organization forming. In reality, each group should be further divided into smaller groups. For instance, the group of local people used in this thesis can be divided into smaller groups by ethnicity, religion or area. After the stakeholders are recognized, they can be analyzed.

Stakeholder Analysis Is a Useful Tool to Study the Stakeholders

Traditionally the stakeholder analysis is utilized during or after the actions. In this thesis, it is used proactively to find the powerful and interested stakeholder groups. It can be argued that each sub-part of the operation should have a core group, which should act in as many levels as possible. It should be established from sufficiently powerful and interested stakeholder groups who are working to achieve the objectives. This supports achieving strategic objectives. In addition, the local groups with high interest should be integrated into the core group. Although they tend to have a high level of interest but low level of power to function individually, integrating them into the core group will support the authority transition process. In addition, the analysis recognized high power groups which had a negative effect on the peace process. Mitigating the actions of these groups is very important and supports the achievement objectives.

Information Supports Achieving Objectives

Access to information is an essential factor in reaching the strategic objectives. The information can be utilized only if it is accessible. The stakeholders should form an information network enabling the information to reach the end-users. This contributes to a situational understanding and to reaching the objectives, and makes it possible to participate in a more efficient way.

The core stakeholders should be integrated into the information network as soon as possible. This will affect their understanding of the objectives and support their objective setting and actions as a whole. Through early participation, interaction is increased by joint planning, execution and evaluating actions. This supports the stakeholders so that they know each other and decreases the obstacles for cooperation.

Evolution-Based Organization Supports Cooperation

The environment and changes in the situation demand the organization to be self-renewing. The structure of the organization is to be based on need. Therefore, the organization has to be able to confront the challenges of time-based changes as well as regional changes in the situation. The core group has to be involved in as many levels as possible to better understand the strategic objectives and their consistent pursuit. The lower the level of the organization, the more it should be based on self-emerging voluntary communities and networks.

Critique of the Conclusions

The presented organization structure cannot be used as such in operations but the ideas it inholds can be used, for instance, in training and planning of an operation. The structure was not tested in practice but all the participants of the survey and interviews were given a possibility to comment on it. They did not express differing opinions towards the argued principles.

All the presented stakeholders were not represented in the survey. This lowers the credibility of the results. The number of respondents was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results can be utilized to better understand the situation of peace operations.

Executive summary

Kokonaisvaltainen lähetymistapa rauhanturvaamiseen on nykytiedon valossa tehokkain tapa nostaa sotaan ajautunut maa jaloilleen. Kokonaisvaltaisudella tarkoitetaan kaikkien sidosryhmien ja suorituskykyjen käyttöä strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi. Kokonaisvaltaisessa toiminnassa hyödynnetään sekä siviili- että sotilastoimijoiden paras tietotaito.

Useissa tutkimuksissa mainitaan sidosryhmien välisen yhteistyön puutteen aiheuttavan toiminnan tehostomuutta. Tämän opinnäytetyön tavoitteena oli selvittää organisaation näkökulmasta mahdollisuuksia tukea yhteistyötä ja muodostaa tulosten perusteella yleisluontoinen organisaatiomalli. Tavoite asetettiin yhteistyössä Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen keskuksen IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention) -projektin kanssa.

Tutkielma lähestyy tavoitetta yleisluontoisen operaation kautta, missä kokonaisvaltaisuus ymmärretään kaikkien toimialueella olevien sidosryhmien yhteistyönä. Organisaatiolla tarkoitetaan näin ollen sidosryhmien muodostamaa kokonaisuutta. Opinnäytetyötä ei sidottu yksittäiseen toimijaan, vaan toimijoista on muodostettu tarkasteluryhmiä. Tästä johtuen mallia ei voi sellaisenaan käyttää, mutta sitä voidaan hyödyntää tilanteeseen sopivan organisaation rakentamisessa.

Opinnäytetyö toteutettiin survey-tutkimuksena. Tarkasteltuja kokonaisuuksia olivat kokonaisvaltaisuuden periaate, operaatioiden kehitys ja menestystekijät, organisaatioteorioiden soveltaminen operaatioihin, toimintaympäristön sidosryhmien tunnistaminen sekä niiden halu ja kyky vaikuttaa lopputulokseen.

Data kerättiin tutkimalla alan teoriaa, kyselyllä ja haastatteluin. Teoriaosuuden perustan muodostavat julkaistut ja vertaisarvioitit artikkelit. Kyselyä ja haastatteluja hyödynnettiin tiedon täydentämiseen ja varmentamiseen rauhanturvaamiseen soveltuvaksi. Vastajilta ja haastateltavilta vaadittiin laaja kokemus rauhanturvaamisen ylätasolta.

Data analysoitiin pääosin sisällönanalyysin keinoin ja tukena käytettiin tilastollisia menetelmiä. Pääanalyysimenetelminä käytettiin laadullista sisällönanalyysiä sekä sisällön erittelyä. Kahden kyselykierroksen data analysoitiin tilastollisin menetelmin.

Tutkimuksen kannalta keskeiset tulokset ovat esitetty alla.

Kokonaisvaltaisudella on monta kutsumanimeä

Useat kansainväliset toimijat, kuten esimerkiksi Euroopan Unioni ja Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat, ovat tunnistaneeet tarpeen toimia kokonaisvaltaisesti strategisten tavoitteiden

saavuttamiseksi. Usein toimijat kuitenkin käyttävät samoista asioista erilaisia nimityksiä toiminnan selittämiseksi. Kokonaisvaltaista lähestymistapaa on kuvattu esimerkiksi termein Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Missions ja Whole-of-Government Approach. Termien moninaisuus sekoittuu useissa yhteyksissä. Tässä opinnäytetyössä kokonaisvaltaisuus käsitetään nykyaikaiseksi rauhanturvaamiseksi ja siitä käytetään termiä Peace Operations.

Sidosryhmien tunnistaminen välttämätöntä kokonaisvaltaisessa toiminnassa

Nykyaikaisen rauhanturvaamisen toiminta-alueella toimii useita sidosryhmiä. Sidosryhmät on ensin tunnistettava, jotta ne voivat edes teoriassa toimia tavoitteellisesti asetettujen päämäärien hyväksi. Tunnistaminen tulee tehdä valmistelu- ja suunnitteluvaiheessa mahdollisimman aikaisen osallistamisen varmistamiseksi. Sidosryhmät voidaan ryhmitellä esimerkiksi toiminnan, tavoitteiden, maantieteellisen toiminta-alueen tai hallintotason mukaisesti.

Jokainen operaatio on ainutlaatuinen, mutta tässä työssä käsiteltiin yleisluontoista operaatiota. Tästä johtuen opinnäytetyössä muodostettiin kaksikymmentä ryhmittymää, joita hyödynnettiin kokonaisvaltaisen organisaation rakentamisessa. Tositilanteessa kukin muodostettu ryhmittymä tulee jakaa yksityiskohtaisemmin. Esimerkiksi tässä työssä käytettiin paikallisten ihmisten ryhmittymä, mikä pitäisi todellisuudessa jakaa yksityiskohtaisemmaksi esimerkiksi etnisen taustan, uskonnon tai asuinalueen mukaan. Kun toimijat on tunnistettu voidaan aloittaa niiden analysointi.

Sidosryhmäanalyysiä kannattaa hyödyntää toimijoiden analysoinnissa

Perinteisesti sidosryhmäanalyysiä hyödynnetään toiminnan aikaisessa ja jälkeisessä arvioinnissa. Tässä opinnäytetyössä analyysiä hyödynnettiin ennakoivasti kyvykkäiden ja kiinnostuneiden sidosryhmien tunnistamisessa. Tuloksena havaittiin, että operaation osa-alueisiin kannattaa muodostaa ydinryhmät, jotka toimivat mahdollisimman monella tasolla. Ydinryhmään tulisi kuulua riittävän kyvykäs ja kiinnostunut ryhmä tavoitteiden eteen ponnistelevia. Tällä tuetaan strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamista. Lisäksi ydinryhmään tulisi integroida paikalliset kiinnostuneet ryhmät. Näillä paikallisilla ryhmillä on tyypillisesti korkea halu toimia, mutta heikko kyky toimia itsenäisesti. Paikallisten ryhmien integrointi ydinryhmään edesauttaa myöhemmin vastuun siirtämisessä paikallisille. Analyysissä havaittiin myös erittäin kyvykäs joukko ryhmittymiä, joilla oli halu toimia rauhanprosessia vastaan. Näiden ryhmien huomioiminen on erittäin tärkeää lopputuloksen kannalta.

Tieto tukee tavoitteiden saavuttamista

Tiedon saatavuus on keskeinen tekijä strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamisessa. Tietoa voidaan hyödyntää vain jos se on saatavilla. Rauhanturvaamisen sidosryhmien tulisi

muodostaa tietoverkosto, jonka avulla tieto kohtaa tehokkaasti tarvitsijan. Tämä parantaa tilanteen ymmärtämistä, tavoitteiden saavuttamista ja antaa mahdollisuuden osallistua toimintaan.

Ydinsidosryhmät tulisi ottaa mukaan tiedon vaihtoon mahdollisimman aikaisessa vaiheessa, jotta strategisten tavoitteiden ymmärrys vaikuttaisi omien tavoitteiden asetteluun ja kaikkeen toimintaan. Aikaisen osallistamisen kautta yhdessä tehty suunnittelu, toteutus ja toteutuksen arviointi lisäävät sidosryhmien välistä vuorovaikutusta. Tämän avulla sidosryhmillä on mahdollisuus tuntea toisiaan syvällisemmin ja pienentää kynnystä yhteistyöhön.

Evoluutioon perustuva organisaatio tukee yhteistyötä

Toimintaympäristön ja tilanteen muutokset edellyttävät organisaatiolta uusiutumiskykyä. Organisaatorakenne tulee perustua tarpeeseen. Tämän vuoksi organisaation on kyettävä vastaamaan sekä ajallisesti että alueellisesti erilaisiin ja muuttuviin tilanteisiin. Ydinsidosryhmien tulee olla mukana mahdollisimman monella tasolla, jotta strategiset tavoitteet ymmärretään ja niitä tavoitellaan johdonmukaisesti. Mitä alemmas organisaatorakenteessa laskeudutaan sitä enemmän toiminnan tulisi perustua itseohjautuvien vapaaehtoisten yhteisöjen ja verkostojen toimintaan.

Johtopäätösten arviointi

Esitettyä organisaatorakennetta ei voi sellaisenaan käyttää operaatioissa, mutta sen sisältämiä ideoita voidaan hyödyntää esimerkiksi koulutuksessa ja operaation suunnittelussa. Rakennetta ei testattu käytännössä, mutta kaikille kyselyyn ja haastatteluun osallistuneilla varattiin kommentointimahdollisuus. He eivät esittäneet eriäviä mielipiteitä esiintuotuja periaatteita vastaan.

Kyselyn vastaajat eivät edustaneet kaikkia opinnäytetyössä esiteltyjä sidosryhmiä. Tämä osaltaan laskee tulosten uskottavuutta. Vastaajien lukumäärä ei ole riittävä tilastollisesti merkittävien johtopäätösten tekemiseen. Tuloksia voidaan kuitenkin hyödyntää paremman tilanneymmärryksen aikaansaamiseksi.

Sidosryhmien yhteistyön puute on yksi tehottomuuden aiheuttaja rauhanturvaoperaatioissa. Tässä opinnäytetyössä yhteistyötä lähestytään organisaation näkökulmasta. Opinnäytetyö on toteutettu yhteistyössä Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen keskuksen IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention) -projektin kanssa. Työn tavoitteet ovat osaltaan määräytyneet yhteistyön pohjalta.

Abbreviations and acronyms in alphabetical order

Abbreviation or acronym	Explanation
AU	African Union
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CCM	Comprehensive Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Center
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CMO	Crisis Management Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EBAO	Effect Based Approach to Operations
EBO	Effect Based Operations
EU	European Union
FINCENT	Finnish International Center
GO	Governmental Organization
ICM	Integrated Crisis Management
IECEU	Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
MNE	Multinational Experiment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force (Egypt)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle-East)
WHOGA	Whole-of-Government Approach

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background of Peace Operations

Ineffectiveness is common when supporting nations to build sustainable peace. Lives, time, money and equipment are wasted and hope for a better future is lost by incapable management of situations. By using available resources ineffectively, or unwillingly, the crisis is prolonged and number of casualties rises.

Reasons for inefficiency have been discussed vastly. One key reason is inability to coordinate and to cooperate (IECEU 2015, Annex 2; Häikiö 2016, 14–17; Bishop 2011, 67–72; Ryter 2001, 40–41; Isles 2005, 53–59; Smith 2004, 11). The survey conducted for this thesis also supports this observation.

The United Nations have commonly been recognized to be the main provider of peace framework (Lijn 2006). It can be argued that other relevant providers are the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Organizations can cooperate in missions to widen the perspective and to increase available capabilities. This types of missions are introduced in section 2.1. Organizations mentioned do not usually have as comprehensive capabilities and legitimacy as the United Nations have.

The United Nations' budget for its 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations is currently \$8.27 billion, total number of personnel working in these operations is almost 119,000 and the amount of people living in the operation areas is 125 million. Compared to global military expenditures the budget is 0.5 %. (United Nations 2016a; United Nations 2016b.) This is presented only to give an idea of the resources and effects.

Indications exist that the capabilities are used inefficiently. UN security council's procurement audit (United Nations 2006) indicated a misuse of hundreds of millions of US dollars. Utstein study revealed that less than 45 % of peacebuilding projects had a link to a strategic objective (Smith 2004, 10). This and many other studies have shown the lack of coherence between actions and objectives. Reaching strategic objectives is severely hampered due to this. (Coning 2012, 72.) A better level of coherence is needed to perform more efficiently.

The Assistant Secretary General Banbury (2016) wrote in an article in New York Times that mismanagement and political drivers are prime reasons for the inefficiency of peace operations. He warns that bureaucracy is getting in the way of objectives. As an example, he mentions that 80 % of the resources in the Mali operation are used for logistics and self-protection. Banbury forms it well:

“If you locked a team of evil geniuses in a laboratory, they could not design a bureaucracy so maddeningly complex, requiring so much effort but in the end incapable of delivering the intended results. The system is a black hole into which disappear countless tax dollars and human aspirations, never to be seen again”. (Banbury, 2016.)

As the United Nations’ peacekeeping efforts are failing on top level, the root level is also facing challenges. The forces are committing incomprehensible crimes which are partly ignored by senior staff. (Banbury 2016; Du Plessis & Pete 2004; Patrick 2015.) It seems obvious that critical evaluation needs to be done to get a better track record.

Today the operations, for instance, in Iraq, Ukraine, Ivory Coast, Mali, Central African Republic and Afghanistan are commonly considered more demanding than the earlier ones (Finnish Government 2014, 12). Latest operations and peacebuilding are often considered ways to modernize the institutions and governance within the country to support the sustainability (Pugh 2004, 40, cited in Coning 2012, 35). The recent operations in Afghanistan and operations against ISIS have been formed by coalitions of more than 50 countries. These, and other recent, complex operations have guided us towards comprehensiveness and cooperation of all the stakeholders. Purely military solutions are argued to fail. (Stavridis 2016, v; Finnish Government 2009, 16–18; Rietjens & Lucius 2016, 1; Frerks 2016, 42; Olsthoorn & Soeters 2016, 246; NATO 2010a, 6–7; European Union 2013, 13; United Nations 2013b, 6.)

Stedman (2001, 12) categorized 16 operations from 1980 to 2000 where in most cases UN was the principal implementer. Six were deemed to be successful, four were partial successes and six were failures. A correlation between the difficulty, willingness and the outcome was discovered. The more difficult the situation, the more likely it was to be a failure if the willingness was low. Unfortunately, implementing an operation without sufficient level of willingness is estimated to have a high risk of failing. Also, in some cases when the international community is not intervening rapidly they are not acting as they are expected to. This brings a balancing dilemma between state’s rights and international community’s responsibility to protect individuals.

Evaluating the crises at hand by using Stedman’s (2001, 10–11) criteria we can argue that the consideration of more complex operations is useful. The variables used were the number of parties involved, the state of peace agreement, the status of spoilers¹, the state of the nation, the amount of soldiers in arms, available natural resources, the networks interfering

¹ Spoiler is a person or a group benefitting of a crisis and not seeing sustainable peace in their best interest.

and the reason for the crisis. Categorizing operations as successes or failures is not black or white. For instance, should operations such as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) be considered successes or failures as the latest of them, UNFICYP, began in 1964 and is still ongoing (United Nations 2013)? At least the mentioned operations have contributed to peace and the areas are relatively stable. Coning (2012, 27) has stated that in some cases the state needs support from the international community for an indefinite time, which he argues to be a far better solution than war.

The overall observation is that peace operations have adapted to situations from dividing the warring factions to a complex state building which cannot be handled by any stakeholder by itself. Problems are so demanding that they should be handled internationally (Koenders 2016, x–xi). Only through mutual respect and understanding an efficient complex operation can be created. (Shetler-Jones 2016, 101; Mougne & Groot 2016, 232). Comprehensiveness, integration, hybrid or whole-of-government operations are not the objective but a means to reach it. The demand for organized cooperation is estimated to rise in the future. The success or failure can be determined only by long-term achievements related to the country's pacification. (Coning 2016, 24; Harisalo 2010, 315.)

1.2 Objective and Research Questions

The objective for the thesis was suggested by IECEU² project coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences and Finnish National Defence University's International Center. Finland's Crisis Management Centre has also been consulted to define the objective. Hassi (2016) introduces a need for further study which would answer how a peace operation should be conducted, lead and managed to be more efficient.

This thesis contributes to the complexity of a peace operation's organization. The objective is to introduce a comprehensive generic model for the organization that supports interaction. The model cannot be applied directly to any environment but it will give ideas to every environment. The objective is demanding as building sustainable peace and growth is seen to be one of the most difficult tasks (Coning 2012, 181).

The objective is to create an argued organizational model to support the cohesion. The model will inhold organizational theories' principles and lessons learnt from the recent studies conducted in the field of peace operations. The product will not be tied to any specific actor but can be applied to the common peace contributing unions such as the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union. The organigram will highlight ideas and principles on the success essentials.

² Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention.

The research questions are:

1. How should a peace operation be organized to support effectiveness?
 - a. What is a peace operation?
 - b. What are the agents of success in peace operations?
 - c. What is an organization?
 - d. What kind of organization supports interaction?
 - e. Who are the stakeholders in a peace operation?
 - f. What are the powers and interests of the stakeholders that affect an operation?

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

Structure of the thesis is presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Structure of the thesis

Sections from two to five are based on literature reviews. Each section has a specific theme. Many terms are used to explain the entity of peace operations. In second section, the ideology is studied and an answer to the sub-question 1.a is provided. In the same section the principles that enable a peace operation to succeed or fail are introduced and sub-question 1.b is answered. Based on the results, survey rounds 1–3 were developed. The rounds are introduced in sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.

Third section seeks answers to the sub-question 1.c and 1.d. It considers organization through organizational theories and lessons learnt in the context of international and national complex organizations. Third section contributes the guidelines which are to be implemented into the organigram. Based on the results, survey round 4 was developed. The round is introduced in section 6.4.

Fourth section maps the involved stakeholders in peace operations and defines the related problematics. Answers to the sub-question 1.e and 1.f will be argued. Based on the results survey round 5 was developed. The round is introduced in section 6.5.

Fifth section describes the used methods to fulfill the empiricism and the dialogue between theory and empiricism.

Sixth section introduces the survey, its results and conclusions.

Seventh section is a synthesis and it provides a suggestion on how a peace operation should be organized to support interaction. Some guidance is given on how it should be delivered and what are the essentials of it.

Eighth section introduces the main findings of the thesis. Also, critique and assessment of the study is presented.

1.4 Limitations

As the theme is extremely complex some limitations have been identified. The objective was to create a generic organization model for a generic peace operation. Therefore, it will not be tied to any particular organization. It can be applied into the context of, for instance, the United Nations, the European Union or the African Union but it is not solely meant for any of them.

Many definitions can be found for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management and peace operations. These terminologies will not be studied in this thesis. The term *peace operation* will be used to describe the whole spectrum of terms which all have a common goal of establishing sustainable peace.

An operation has many phases, beginning from identifying the need for an operation, continuing with planning and implementing it and finally ending and evaluating it. These phases will not be studied in this thesis. This study concentrates on the situation where the operation has been implemented and is ongoing. Nevertheless, this thesis can be used to support all the phases.

International laws, regulations and policies play a major part in the peace operation context. Stakeholders have policies which greatly affect their ability to interact with other stakeholders. This thesis gives an ideological model on how the cooperation and coordination could be supported in an effective way. Due to the fact that laws, regulations and policies are case-sensitive they will not be addressed here.

The outcome will be an untested but plausible theoretical solution (Harisalo 2010, 36) on how to arrange an operation's organization. Even though the presented organization model is theoretical, it has been subdued to evaluation. This adds on the validity of the model.

2 Peace Operations

In this section a concept of peacekeeping and factors of outcome are studied. By finding the factors supporting sustainable peace, one can develop a structure and main objectives. This applies only to a certain level and the causalities can never be perfectly estimated (Coning 2012, 184; Vego 2006, 51–57). Nevertheless, studies show that some factors are more important than others and this information can be utilized to create the objectives and means towards to reach them.

2.1 Evolution of Peacekeeping

The main object, reaching self-sustaining peace, is simple to write but difficult to achieve. Harisalo (2010, 20) mentions that the objectives are a way to guide all the actions and enable the evaluation process. Without clear objectives, all actions are equally important and prioritizing and decision making is hampered. According to Harisalo (2010, 21), Etzioni states that often the objectives are only symbolic without concrete meaning. This obviously makes it more difficult to evaluate the outcome since clearly stated measures of effectiveness are absent. Coning (2012, 194) and Hughes (2012, 115–117) argue that the most important driver to reach the main objective is to develop the capacity of the supported nation so that it can self-develop and carry the weight of a nation.

It is later shown on the thesis that the mandate tends to drive the objectives and the means. The objectives should be negotiated but often decisions are made, or at least heavily influenced, by the most influential stakeholders (Etzioni, cited in Harisalo 2010, 20).

One can argue that development from traditional peace operations began to evolve towards more complex peace operations in the 1990s. A famous report, *An Agenda for Peace*, was published in the United Nations' General Assembly in 1992. The report introduced the idea of post-conflict peacebuilding. It was aimed at supporting the peace process and avoiding the nation to relapse. (United Nations 1992.) This was the first effort towards comprehensiveness. For two decades, many scholars have put an effort to further develop the idea. It seems that many stakeholders try to reach similar objectives individually and cooperation appears to be the hardest part (Coning & Friis 2011, 270–272).

Today the operations are considered to be more demanding. There might not be a sustainable peace agreement or at least all the factions are not honoring it. Typically, more than two factions exist in modern crises and situations are close to civil wars. These environmental changes have caused the troops to interfere and, to some extent, lose their neutrality. The efforts are seen as long-term and the contributors are performing in a more integrated way (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell & Sitea 2007, 52–54).

Participating unions have started to modify their view on peace operations. Most of them are looking, and even moving, into the same direction but they are using different terms. For instance, the European Union is using the term comprehensive approach, the United Nations is using hybrid or integrated operations, and in some studies the term is comprehensive crisis management. In addition, whole-of-government approach is also widely used.

Categorizing peace operations can be done in many ways. In general, the operations are divided into generations. Kenkel (2013) divides the operations into five generations while Dorn (2011) uses two to four generations. The actual number is irrelevant but it is useful to understand the development as each generation has evolved from the previous ones. It is also important to understand that an operation might vary between different generations and have typical features of more than one generation at once. Level of military force, type of civilian tasks and level of cooperation with local organizations are the main variants of differentiating the generations (Kenkel 2013, 123–125). Five generation model is introduced in the following paragraphs and in Table 1.

Generation Typical factors	Legitimacy is based on	Components	Common issues
First generation Traditional	UN's charter's chapter VI	Military	Monitoring and reporting.
Second generation Traditional	UN's charter's chapter VI	Military Civilian	Monitoring and reporting. Political transition.
Third generation Peace enforcement	UN's charter's chapter VII	Military Civilian	Humanitarian intervention.
Fourth generation Peacebuilding	UN's charter's chapter VII	Military Civilian+	State building.
Fifth generation Multiple commands	UN's charter's chapter VII	Military + Civilian ++	State building. Hybrid of many operations.
Plus sign indicates that the component is more advanced than it was earlier.			

Table 1: Peacekeeping evolution (Kenkel 2013)

First generation is often referred as traditional peacekeeping. Typical factors for this generation are that it has strict rules of engagement aiming for self-protection, the mandate is under the United Nations Charter's Chapter VI, and the international military, i.e. peacekeeping force, is armed lightly. Often the operation has the host nation or nations' consent, the forces implementing the operation are impartial to all factions and they are not to use force. (Kenkel 2013, 125–126) Typical operations have been unarmed observer missions such as United Nations Truce Supervision Force in the Middle East. (Kenkel 2013, 126–127; Dorn 2011.) Dorn (2011) divides the operations, for instance Egypt, where troops

are to separate combatants into separate groups while Kenkel (2013, 126–127) sees these as a part of the first generation. Observer missions have often been referred to as eternal operations since most have started from 1940's to 1960's and are still operational.

Second generation adds the civilian component to the missions. Main civilian concern is to address political transition to support the peace process. Tasks such as organizing elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and promoting human rights are common. Operations in Namibia, Mozambique and El Salvador are examples of second generation operations. Since the mandate for the military pillar is alike with the first generation, the need to evolve was noticed in the infamous operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. (Kenkel 2013, 128–129; Dorn 2011.) The failures in these operations created the third generation.

Peace enforcement operations have a broader mandate to use force and are typically implemented under the United Nations Charter's Chapter VII. A new term 'humanitarian intervention' was the outcome of the third generation. The state's right of non-intervention was weighed against the responsibility to maintain human rights, i.e. the responsibility to protect human rights. This generation introduced an active use of regional stakeholders such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Kosovo and Australia in East Timor. (Kenkel 2013, 130–132; Dorn 2011.)

Fourth generation has the military mandate of the previous generation but the civilian task and the mandate is elevated. By this, the United Nations practically takes all the responsibility and authority in the corresponding state. These operations are usually referred to as peacebuilding where the conflict's root causes are addressed and the state is basically built from ashes. This tends to widen the scope and bring many stakeholders with their own agendas into the theatre. Operations in East Timor and in Kosovo are examples of this generation. (Kenkel 2013, 132–135; Richmond 2004, 84–87; Dorn 2011.)

Hybrid missions are the latest, the fifth generation. The describing features of missions of this generation include even more stakeholders in the theatre and mixed commands under the United Nations and regional command. This signifies that several units are operating in the same area under different command. This applies to civilian actors too. For instance, operations in Darfur and Afghanistan are hybrid operations. (Kenkel 2013, 135–137.)

As mentioned by Barder (2010), complex problems cannot be solved by design but by evolution. The idea of evolutionary development is visible in the operations. One main problem is that each case is different and one generation might work better than the other in some circumstances. It can be argued that the key is to be flexible. The mission should have sufficient capabilities in relation to its mandate. Adjusting the mandate and the capabilities

should be possible and should be done during the operation if needed. The capability level should always be higher than the need.

Today many organizations, for instance, the European Union, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognize the terms comprehensive crisis management, comprehensive approach and integrated approach. All the mentioned organizations have a slightly different approach to the terms but all models have an idea of cooperating with governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to enable the state building. On the other hand, Mero (2009, 55, 96–101) noticed that most vital differences are that some exclude the non-governmental organizations outside the comprehensiveness. The reason for this is that some have a strong vision of how the objective should be reached or an own agenda, which both might hamper the cooperation.

In this thesis, the term *peace operation* was used to describe a situation where the state is merely non-existing and comprehensive support is needed to enable sustainable peace. This definition was selected because it was considered to be the broadest term and it included the most demanding situations.

Lehtonen (2009) argues that cooperating should start from training and planning together to support the understanding of objectives. He also suggests that a good starting point for a better cooperation would be developing the strategy together with all the stakeholders. Frerks et al. (2006, 36) argue that the non-governmental organizations appear to be moving towards comprehensiveness since the mandates have developed and become broader. This might contribute to a broader interest of planning together.

Instruments of comprehensiveness can be understood as diplomacy, civil and military crisis management, humanitarian methods and development cooperation (Kempilä 2010). Hassi (2015, 103, 111–124; 2016, 18–21) adds overall leading of the operation to be an integral part of a successful peace operation. The military context can be defined as strategic level planning and leading and aiming to restore, secure and reconstruct the society's vital structures. These objectives are met by using the political, administrative, financial, humanitarian and military methods effectively. (Kempilä 2010; Pitkänen 2011.)

Comprehensiveness focuses on coordination and communication between the stakeholders, especially before the peace operation. It has been seen to include the legal judiciary, rule of law, human security and humanitarian issues (United Nations 1994, 22; Rintakoski & Autti 2008, 11).

2.2 Operation's Structure

In this chapter, operational lines are presented and an overall structure of a peace operation is bound into the typical systematic way of presenting operations. Therefore, first the idea of operational structure is explained.

To understand the operational planning process, one needs to understand the ideology behind it. Ojasalo (2016) gives a good rationalization of strategic planning in business context, by using an example of orienteering. If a person is placed in an unknown location with a map, he first needs to understand where he is, then where he wants to go, after that which route should be taken and how it should be traveled. This can be applied to peace operations as follows: one needs to define the current situation, decide what the objective will be, what is the way to get there and finally how the way is going to be traveled. The idea of a basic structure is presented in Figure 2. Obviously, in this case, it is necessary to develop an understanding of who is the one traveling. This is addressed in the fourth section.

As mentioned, first we need to develop an idea of where we stand. As Laakkonen (2011) argues, many reasons for the need to implement a peace operation exist: for instance, failed states³ and a spillover of a conflict. In relation to this thesis, we can use these as causes for the intervention. To point out “where we stand” we can generalize the idea to be somewhat the opposite than the “where we want to go”, or the end-state in Figure 2. Obviously, it would be easier to succeed in the operation if the starting point was not in the strategy map's opposite corner.

To establish an idea where we want to go, we need to see the context and what has caused the situation. At this point we can call this objective to be the end-state. The end-state is defined by analyzing the success factors of a peace operation and by the conducted survey.

The way to achieve the objective is the next thing to be decided. Based on studies, the current best practice is the comprehensive approach ideology which uses all the capabilities to reach the common goal. This thesis supports the ideology of comprehensiveness.

The last thing to be decided about the operation is to establish the operational lines which support the common goal the best way. They are explained later in this section.

³ A term *collapsed state* or *failed state* is often used which describes the overall situation well. The foundations of a sustainable state might not exist or only ruins remain. It is possible that deliberate breaches of human rights have occurred during the war. For instance, these reasons argue that a more throughout view needs to be developed into peace operations than just monitoring the fulfillment of peace agreement.




Figure 2: Idea of operational structure (Joint Publication 5-0 2011, III–15)

The operational basic structure includes defining the operational phases and possibly operational sub-lines, leverage points for each operational line, criteria to allow continuing from a separate leverage point and the order for the points established. Operational planning defines the tasks for stakeholders and attaches them to the operational lines. These were assessed to be unnecessary to do within this thesis.

2.3 Systematic Approach to Military Operations

Interconnections in war and peace are evident. The execution of peace operations has approached the comprehensive ideology. One can argue that the execution of military operations makes no difference even though the objectives are different. For instance, Mero (2009, 55, 96–101) argues that Finland's national defence's comprehensive model and comprehensive approach in crisis management are supporting actions to each other as both tie all the capabilities to achieve common goal. He mentions that both models should be seen as an ideology instead of executing tasks and processes. Hyytiäinen (2016) shares this ideology of similarities in war operations to peace operations.

When considering the military operations, it can be noted that the art of war has travelled from classical approach towards systemic view (Vego 2009). Similarly, like peacekeeping also the art of war can be introduced through generations. The generations are introduced in Table 2. (Bahnareanu 2015, 57–66.)

In pre-World War period, the militaries fought against each other on clear fronts and the wars were commonly between states. During the 1st and 2nd World Wars the wars were still fought between states or alliances. The difference between World Wars is that development of armament made it possible to target larger areas and move faster. These changes were

adapted by the German's in Blitzkrieg. (Bahnareanu 2015, 57–60; Hobson 2010, 625–631.) Simultaneously, civilians were more clearly targeted in the war.

Typical factors Generation	Peak period	Characteristics
First generation Mass manpower	1 st World War	Nation states' militaries. Fighting in lines and columns. Low technology: muskets, grenades etc.
Second generation Concentration of firepower	2 nd World War	Nation states' militaries. Reliance on firepower. Medium technology: indirect fire, armored vehicles and airplanes.
Third generation Maneuver warfare	2 nd world War to Vietnam and Korea.	Nation states' militaries. Bypassing front lines. Advanced medium technology: ships, tanks, air vessels.
Fourth generation Insurgency and terrorism	United States in Vietnam. Soviet Union in Afghanistan.	Emerging of non-state actors. Professional armies. Asymmetric tactics. Influencing on A-ring. See Figure 3.
Fifth generation Non-contact warfare	21 st century.	War against non-state actors. Fading of targets. Combination of all means: information, terrorist attacks, random targets, use of criminals.

Table 2: Warfare generations (Bahnareanu 2015, 57–66)

Giulio Douhet was one of the key people related to strategic bombings during the 2nd World War. He highlighted the importance of air force. The idea was to destroy certain cities by air and to collapse civilian support for the military actions. It was assumed that it would cause the targeted people to start a revolution and end military actions. (Douhet 1942.) The mentioned methods were vastly used by both parties but later they have been found somewhat ineffective. No proof has been presented that the opposite side could be won by only using the air assets in major cities. (Gates 1997, 248–249; Mitchell 1967, 49–53.) This ideology has been seen as the pre-version of effect-centric paradigms because the effects are aimed at a larger focus than just the opposing military (Sirén 2012, 251; Szafranski 1998; 125).

The idea of affecting several areas at the same time was presented by colonel Warden in the Persian Gulf in the 1990s. The principle is to paralyze the rings from A to E and concentrate all the power on the A-ring (see Figure 3). This was assumed to collapse the nations' will to continue fighting. The categorization to five levels was argued to be applicable to almost every situation. (Warden 1998, 107–109.)

Sirén (2012, 250–256) introduces four paradigms of the art of war. They also project the development from purely military point of view to a more comprehensive idea. The paradigms are target-centric, effects-centric, comprehensiveness in crises management and strategic communications. The idea of affecting is introduced in Figure 3 and it is tied to Warden's rings. Sirén argues that affecting the values and identities is the most efficient way to have an effect. Coning (2012, 268) and Meadows (1999, 2–3) argue that in peacekeeping the most crucial effects can be delivered by focusing on the higher leverages as paradigms. In this context, it can be understood as supporting the values and identities presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Paradigms and their effects to modified Warden's rings (Sirén 2012, 251–252)

More systemic views began to emerge in the end of 1990s. One of these is Effect-Based Operations (EBO) introduced by the United States and other Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) introduced by NATO as well as Systemic Operational Design (SOD) applied by Israel and lastly Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). The idea is that a nation is a system which can be divided in to subsystems. By understanding the system of systems an effective plan can be created to fulfill the objective. (Siren 2012, 250–256; Vego 2006, 51–59; Vego 2009, 40–48; Challans 2006.)

The systemic views to warfare have included more guidance to the use of non-military capabilities to reach an objective than previous guidances. Yet, they have been criticized of simplifying the crises enormously and supporting the idea that the consequences can be predicted in complex situations such as war. The more complex the military objective is the

harder it is to predict how it should be fulfilled. (Vego 2006, 51–59; Vego 2009, 40–48; Challans 2006; Sirén 2012, 253; Mattis 2008, 105–108.) The same principle has been identified by Coning (2012, 181, 290) in relation to peacebuilding. He argues that it is impossible to fully understand the complex systems. Davis (2001, xiv) argues that the objective of systematic approach is to enhance the odds of success and to help to understand the causalities better. Davis’s idea deserves some critique since especially understanding the causalities has been deemed to be merely impossible in more recent sources.

The development of military operations can be seen somewhat similar to the development of peace operations. Both are on a journey towards more complex situations which demands a more comprehensive way of thinking to reach the end-states.

	Typical Elements	Description
Douhet Prior to 2 nd World War	Strategic bombings	Air force importance was highlighted. Assumption of fighting spirit being collapsed when strategic targets are being bombed by all the possible capabilities e.g. bombs and gas. Targets included civilian infrastructure.
Warden Persian Gulf	Decision making Key functions Infrastructure Population Armed forces	Paralyzing all the elements and concentrating on decision making.
EBO, EBOA, SOD	Political system Military system Economic system Social system Infrastructure Information system	Systemic view to warfare. By understanding dependencies one can affect the crucial ones and foresee the outcome.
Sirén	Values and Identities	Adds a new level in Warden’s idea. By influencing the core of a nation, it can be affected.

Table 3: Factors of warfare (Douhet 1942; Warden 1998; Vego 2006; Sirén 2012)

McGlade (2006) found in his graduate research for master’s degree that Effects Based Operations and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) are very similar to each other. The difference is that SOD is presenting the incapability to predict the outcome more clearly than EBO. According to Sirén (2012, 252), EBAO highlights soft ways of affecting when EBO is more concentrated in kinetic ways.

EBO and EBAO both see the nation as an internal system of systems. They acknowledge that the overall system is built of subsystems of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems. *Field manual 3.0* adds physical terrain and time to the subsystems (Field Manual 3.0 2008, 1–5, 1–9; Vego 2006, 51–57). According to Davis (2011, xiii), the EBO instruments used to achieve objectives are military, diplomatic, psychological and economic. Lines of operation are described to be political, information, military and economical (USFJCOM 2006, s.III–21). Vego (2009) also refers to diplomacy, information, military and economic (Vego 2009, 42).

The presented ideas can be adapted to peace operations in some extent and they will be considered in the summary.

2.4 Drivers for Success or Failure in Peace Operations

What determines the success of peace operations? Paris (1997, 57) has stated that sustainability of peace after an operation is halted can be considered a measure of effectiveness. Stedman (2001, 8) adds sub-measures as economic growth, good governance and equitable development.

It is important to understand the factors in operational environment prior to developing means to affect them (United Nations 1992, 21). As it is described earlier, predicting the causalities is difficult in complex environments. Obviously, it needs to be understood that some situations are more difficult than others and stabilizing is strongly affected by the level of complexity. The need for strategic coordination, and resources, is dependent of the complexity (Jones 2001, 2–3).

Laakkonen (2011) describes the possible risk conditions such as failed governance, conflict spill-over, vulnerabilities in ungoverned strategic spaces and resource rich territories, border disputes, extremism and uncontrolled migration. He emphasizes that it is necessary to understand the environment and the transition process from conflict to safety. Laakkonen emphasizes that the peace process' spoilers need to be defined from the correct point of view in order to support the transition.

Traditionally signing of peace agreement and arranging elections have been seen as a new beginning. Nevertheless, the period following the signing has been argued to be the most unstable period, inholding the uncertainties and dangers. As it was shown in Angola and Rwanda during the 1990s, the failure in peace process can cause hundreds of thousands, even millions of people to be killed. (Stedman 2001, 4; Caplan 2012, 115–118; Ahmed, Keating & Solinas 2007, 14.) By studying the reasons for the state to relapse, methods can be found to mitigate them (Malone 2001).

According to Hirschmann (2010, 373), one road towards stability is to conduct institution building within the country. This will enhance the local capacity to perform as a state.

Stedman (2001, 2, 10) argues that the most important environmental factors are spoilers and neighboring states. By spoilers he means the stakeholders opposing the peace process because it is not in their interest. Neighboring states can be seen harmful due to the same reasons as spoilers but, in addition, they often support the local spoilers.

Key element for success is that peace is in the interest of a regional major power or otherwise a major power. In extremely complex situations, critical consideration towards the establishment of a peace operation should be done if such support is non-existent. International community's and other states interests to risk resources also has a great affect. Often stakeholders also have other motives to support peace than just a pure will to help. (Stedman 2001, 2–5.)

One of the most important parts in the peace process is to transform the warring stakeholders into political parties. This can be done in ways of demobilization and demilitarization. (Stedman 2001, 5–6.) Even though the furtherance of human rights is often seen as an important task, Tonya Putnam sees a clear causality between the transformation process and the fulfilment of human rights. Joanna Spear also sees the demobilization to be the most important goal towards peace (Stedman 2001, 15–16).

Development in civilian security and local capacity building are found to be cost-effective ways of supporting the peace process. Nevertheless, failure in these two has not been seen as a facilitator of overall failure in peace process itself. (Stedman 2001, 3–6; Coning 2012.)

In Stedman's (2001, 10–11) study the complexity of the situation was assessed using the following factors: existence of spoilers, presence of disposable natural resources, presence of hostile neighbor states or networks, presence of a major power interest, existence of the peace agreement and the coercion level of signing, status of the collapsed state, number of soldiers, number of warring parties and demands for secession. First four factors have the most crucial effect on success.

International community's interest is considered to be one of the crucial factors to determine if the efforts and resources are sufficient (Stedman 2001, 11).

The potential factors of success have been collected into Table 4. Internal factors are the ones deriving within the country and external factors are rising from outside the country.

Internal	External
State of peace agreement.	International interest for peace: global, regional.
Leadership through elections or other means.	Mitigating spoilers' supporters.
Local capability to act responsibly.	Supporting demobilization.
Spoilers benefitting from the crisis.	Supporting security.
Converting armed factions into political parties.	Long-term commitment.
Level of human security.	Supporting of local identity.

Table 4: Factors of Success (Stedman 2001; Hirschmann 2010; Coning 2012; Sirén 2012)

2.5 The Operational Lines of Peace Operations

In this section the possibilities for operational lines will be explored. They should be closely tied to the success factors in peace operations. The lines have been collected into Table 5 to clarify the idea.

Although the basic structure seems to have clear boundaries between operational lines it needs to be understood that they are tied to each other and stakeholders can support several operational lines simultaneously. Many see boundary crossing activities as important. This means, for instance, shared understanding of the end-state and strategy and information access. (Hirschman 2010, 368; Coning 2016, 18.)

Often organizations promote individual sub-goals to be pre-requisites of enabling peace. This is done to support their own agenda. As mentioned earlier, less than 45 % of development projects had a clear link to the strategic objectives. (Stedman 2001, 5; Smith 2004, 10.) The operational structure should be seen greater than the sum of its parts. Each sub-goal is a way forward towards sustainable peace even though it might be hard to determine which should be addressed as sub-goals within the peace process and which are individual development activities unbound to the operation as a whole (Coning 2012, 30–31, 290).

Source	Security and Rule of Law	Governance and Political System	Development and Economics	Human Rights	Humanitarian Aid
Stedman	X	X	X	X	X
Coning	X	X	X	X	X
Moreland	X	X	X	X	
United Nations	X	X	X	X	X
Ricigliano	X	X	X	X	X

Table 5: Collected operational lines (Coning 2012; United Nations 2006, 2010; Stedman 2001, 2002; Moreland 2015; Ricigliano 2012)

The outcome of Table 5 is a combination of success factors and commonly accepted operational lines. One needs to understand that a viewpoint of a certain source might be such that it concentrates only in some factors. It does not mean that others were neglected but it has not been addressed due to limitations or other reasons.

2.6 Summary

Peace support operations have evolved to be the best possible solutions to complex problems. The difficulty is that complex problems are impossible to define and therefore to solve. Each operation is different from the others just as is the environment. Many lessons can be learnt but the outcome cannot be foreseen. In this thesis, the operational framework is state building in worst possible conditions where the international community needs to take temporary responsibility of actions.

Based on literature, the success factors in peace operations are the local interest to achieve sustainable peace and the international community's interest to support it along all the operational lines presented in Table 5.

The system of systems view to military operations is supporting the findings. Connections between fifth generation peace operations and systemic approaches to warfare can be discovered.

Based on this section, first, second and third survey rounds were developed. The aim was to iterate and possibly verify the findings from the literature. The survey is introduced in sixth section.

3 Organization Forming Principles

In this section an understanding of organization is created. At first, the overall reason for organizing will be argued. Secondly, the aspects of an efficient organization will be introduced by reflecting on organizational theories. These aspects were subdued to a survey where the common principles will be connected to peace operations. This theme is introduced in survey round 4 in section 6.4. The aspects supported will create a basis for the organizational structure presented later.

3.1 Introduction

An organization should always be constructed to achieve certain task as efficiently as possible. It is a way to improve cooperation, interaction and coordination within the stakeholders. (Harisalo 2010, 31; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 19–21; Scott 2003, 33–38.) The organizational structure is to be a description of authority, guidance, supervision and coordinational hierarchy (Harisalo 2010, 41). Organization in this context means all the capabilities used to achieve the objective. This means organizing the capabilities, the structure, the leadership, the culture, the economics, the technology and the environment. One idea is that an organization should interact in all levels and be self-correcting. (Harisalo 2010, 17–18, 313; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 19–21; Scott 2003, 26–30.)

Richmond (2011) argues that areas where peace operations take place often adopt some models from the international community. Some models are adopted through guidance and some through cooperation. He mentions that often the outcome would be better if the locals were supported to build their own models. This applies to state building as well.

Coning (2012, 36–37) argues that the liberal organizational model is seen to be the best organizational model to date, and it supports cooperation with states and organizations that have adapted similar models. According to Coning (2012, 139), Stewart states that it is hard to implement externally designed organizations into a nation since they tend to have their differentiating history of organizations which has adapted to their culture. However, Coning (2012, 38) argues that the state will be affected by the western model due to the stakeholders operating in the area.

The United Nations (2012, 29–31) published a report which announces that an individual peace operation should be organized as one actor. The report also mentions that operations in general can be conducted better. This section's outcome is to point out the principles which should be adopted when building the peace operation's organization.

3.2 Organizations' Overall Idea

Organizations can be categorized in many ways. According to Parson's (Harisalo 2010, 30–31) categorization, a peace operation's organization can be seen as having an integrative role fortifying the positive development and fulfilling the collective needs of a state. As the comprehensive organization is complex, it probably includes factors from all different categories. Therefore, the potential of several categories will be considered and analyzed.

Large organizations are seen to have more need for formality, coordination, integration, supervision and resources than small organizations. Obviously, people in small organizations have more interaction since they possibly know each other personally. In large organizations, the level of formality grows and lessens the amount of individual interaction. Formation of informal groups is argued to be a result of this and a way to increase interaction. (Sjöstrand 1981, 88–91.) This supports the findings presented in the introduction and in the third section that peace operations lack interaction in means of in coordination and cooperation.

Harisalo (2010, 24) and Hatch and Cuncliffe (2006, 114–115) argue that leadership is one crucial factor in success of every organization. Leaders should take a stand on what the direction one should move to is and give an idea of expectations. By centralizing leadership the decision-making process has been seen to develop faster but at the same time more false decisions are made. Centralizing often makes people feel like outsiders and incapable of affecting the actions. According to Seppen and Lucius (2016, 58), both civilian and military stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making process.

Poor organization will create a strict hierarchy and unwillingness to cooperate over the section or office boundaries. If the organization is built well it will enforce the will to cooperate and develop working methods to reach the common goal. (Harisalo 2010, 25.) Systems have the capability to self-organize (Coning 2012, 134). Re-organizing and self-correcting are important and feedback is one crucial factor in it (Hendrick 2009, 6–7; Meadows 1999). The complex system is based on its ability to reside in the self-organizing capability of the local environment (Coning 2012, 184). This idea is supported by an argument that it is possible to solve complex problems by evolutionary means rather than by design, and feedback is an essential part of it (Barder 2010). This means that a correct form of an organization is impossible to develop but an evolving organization that is adapting to its environment is crucial (Coning 2012, 191–193).

In the end, the organization is a social structure which supports reaching the main objective. The capability to self-organize can be enhanced by manipulating the information flow between the stakeholders thus supporting the interaction between them (Coning 2012, 268). Below the peace operation's umbrella, there can be several cooperation levels (Friis & Jarmyr 2008, 14–15). Coning and Friis (2011, 255–258) presented a model where the actors are

united, integrated, cooperative, coordinative, coexisting or competing. The level of coherence can vary between and within stakeholders. Coherence should be based on voluntary actions since it is the most effective way (Coning 2016, 23–24). As each operation is unique, the level of cooperation should be reflecting the operation’s needs (Gourlay 2000, 33–44).

Organization can be understood to be a structure interacting with its environment as shown in Figure 4. In the environment, there are the stakeholders of which some are cooperative and others competitive. As a whole, they can be understood as a network of organizations trying to fulfill their own objectives. The network can be structuralized by using branches where each organization works. Branches can be divided for instance into technological, economical, political and legal, social and cultural and physical. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 63–77.)




Figure 4: Environment and the network (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 77)

Organizations also have a symbolic meaning. The physical structures are a part of the message the organization is sending. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 246.) By underlining the local ownership or comprehensive collaboration among the international stakeholders it is controversial to build each stakeholder their own camp or their own building. It is not embracing the message of collaboration. Actions should embrace collaboration and thus support the achievement of objectives.

Organizational structures vary based on the need. Organizational types are presented in Figure 5. Often the structure is a combination of different models. The structure can alter on the organization’s different levels. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 295–310; Harisalo 2010, 73–77.) It can be assumed that the conclusion of this study will be a combination of structures since it is very common in large organizations.




Figure 5: Some organizational types (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 295–310; Harisalo 2010, 73–77; Scott 2003, 242, 276)

Matrix organization has vertical and horizontal information flows. The unity of command is set aside in this context. An easy way to understand the matrix is to see the functions as service producers for the processes and processes as the ones creating the value. (Harisalo 2010, 74; Scott 2003, 242–244; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 301–303.) In peace support operations, the processes can be understood as operational lines and the functions as performing tasks such as evaluation and information managing. Global matrix adds the service producers to the context and applies the functions so that they can provide services to broader area (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 304–306.)

Project is an objective-oriented temporary organization which has limited time, resources and a task. A project organization uses experts from all the processes and functions based on their need. The experts are forming a new group together and performing separate tasks. The task obviously greatly affects the need of staff and individuals' use of time. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 302–303; Artto, Martinsuo and Kujala 2006, 24, 273–342.) An individual peace operation can be understood as a large project (Tsvetkov, 2016).

Multidivisional structure is supporting vertical information flow and a clear unity of command (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 299–301). Divisions are understood to be similar to each other. In peace operations, divisions can be seen as different operations or regional commands within a country.

Functional design has vertical information flow and clear unity of command. Functions are clear and divided from each other. (Harisalo 2010, 73–74; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 297–298.)

In the context of this thesis, this can be understood as using the operational lines as functions.

Virtual design and networks are based on nodes which connect the stakeholders. Virtual versions are often mainly based on interaction in information networks. The idea of emerging is free and voluntary. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 306–308.) An example of networks is internet-based services where the buyer and seller connect via an application.

3.3 Organizational Theories

In this chapter, some organizational theories and their branches are introduced. The idea is to find potential functions to be subdued to an expert panel and to find founding principles to develop the organization for a peace operation.

Especially in large organizations it is common that a structure is a mix of different types of organizational forms. Therefore, the ideas of very different kind of theories and themes are considered. Some theories are popular in current models of the organization building of peace operations but, for this thesis, it was more useful to have a broader look than look into the current organization and fix its flaws. This ideology is supported by Hatch and Cunliffe (2006, 97).

Theory, Theme or Factor
Classical Organization Theory:
Common guidance, coordination, supervision and unity of command are executed in the organization (1, 2). Structure is a definition of power and responsibility and it needs to be commonly approved (1). Clear meaning can enhance cooperation (3) and enable unit forming (6). Hierarchy should not limit cooperation (2).
Human Relations:
People are the center of capability in organizations and the group they form is essential for success (7). Level of bureaucracy is relieved by considering people to be the center (7). Community is an unofficial organization based on deep interaction beyond boundaries (8). People first thinking emerges enthusiasm, motivation, innovation and adapting (7). Positive community is an enabling factor (8). People form a group and negotiate the objectives for the organization (7). Better results are accomplished if higher needs are satisfied (7).
Strategic Leadership in Organization Theories:
Mental and physical resources should be used efficiently (21). Top leaders develop, abandon and rephrase strategies (21). Strategy formulation connects all functions (21). Strategy is to be evaluated periodically (23). Strategic alliances, unions and partnerships are beneficiary and they can be managed as equals, contract based or delegated arrangement (24, 25). Large organizations' adaptation capability has faced difficulties and therefore smaller independent units have been introduced (22).
Theory of Organizations as Innovations:
Good leadership enables people to give their best ideas and innovations for the organization (29). Certain inefficiency has an enabling effect on innovations (30). Significance of organized cooperation will rise in the future (31).

Theory of Structures:	
Large organizations can have hybrid organizations, e.g. division, matrix and network (9). Structure is based on objectives, efficiency and coordination (10). Complicated organizations self-correct themselves only if it is crucial to their survival (9). Bureaucratic organizations are often missing in countries which host peace operations (9).	
System Theory:	
Structuralizing causalities is beneficiary (13). The main focus is to use resources efficiently (14). Supervision is important (14). Intelligence of overall actions is important (14). Creating methods to understand, collect information of unsolved problems and to gain common understanding (16). Fundamental strategy creates effectiveness (14). Planning is to be interactive (15). Organization should adapt to its environment (15). Organization is more than the sum of its parts i.e. holistic approach (15).	
Evolutional Theory:	
Interdependence between organization and environment is evident (19). Unity with surroundings should be practiced (20). Unity with environment can be reached by mapping, matching, joint optimization and consultation (20).	
Organizations as Cultures:	
Lack off heart and spirit disable even the perfect organization (26). Organization culture enables success (27). Organizing need to process surrounding cultures e.g. language, communication, religion, values, attitudes, social structure (28).	
Scientific Management:	
Comprehensiveness is an enabling factor (4). Supervision of the whole organization is important (5). Specific tasks for leaders create efficiency but might disturb the unity of command (5).	
Decision Making Theory:	
Overall action demands for decisions and they define the success (11). Critical examination of solutions is fundamental need for decision making (12).	
Resource Dependency Theory:	
Resources are used efficiently by networks between organizations (17). Outcome interdependence i.e. organizations need to cooperate to achieve results (18). Behavioral interdependence i.e. people need to cooperate to achieve results (18).	
Sources: 1 = Harisalo 2010, 38–39 2 = Harisalo 2010, 69–71,77–78; Hatch & Cuncliffe 2006,104 3 = Harisalo 2010, 82–83, 88 4 = Harisalo 2010, 57 5 = Harisalo 2010, 62; (Mabon 1974, 31–32) 6 = Galbraith 1995, 25–26 7 = Harisalo 2010, 93, 96–97; (Hawthorne) 8 = Harisalo 2010, 117; Peck 1987, 59–63 9 = Harisalo 2010, 140–142 10 = Harisalo 2010, 128; (Vartola 2004, 8, 20; Scott, Michell & Perry 1981, 137) 11 = Harisalo 2010, 145 12 = Lewis, Goodman & Fant 1995, 200–201 13 = Hatch & Cuncliffe 2006, 37 14 = Harisalo 2010, 185–186; Flood 1999, 40–41 15 = Harisalo 2010, 191–192, 195; Pugh & Hickson 1989, 48–49 (Ackoff 1981, 1999) 16 = Harisalo 2010, 192; (Checkland 1981)	17 = Harisalo 2010, 228; Hatch & Cuncliffe 2006, 80–83 18 = Harisalo 2010, 228–229; (Pfeffer 1962, 193) 19 = Pugh & Hickson 1989, 48–49 20 = Harisalo 2010, 225; Rhenman 1975, 73–86 (Buckley 1967) 21 = Harisalo 2010, 239–240, 242 22 = Naisbitt 1994,273–275; Burns 2005, 126 24 = Harisalo 2010, 255 25 = Harisalo 2010, 256–257 26 = Harisalo 2010, 266 27 = Harisalo 2010, 273 28 = Harisalo 2010, 275–277 29 = Harisalo 2010, 286 30 = Harisalo 2010, 310 31 = Harisalo 2010, 315 In case Harisalo is used as secondary source and primary source is not revised the primary source is informed in brackets.

Table 6: Factors from organizational theories and themes

Some main factors of organizational theories and leadership theories are collected into Table 6. The factors were collected through peace support operations literature. Based on a reflection, 24 factors were selected to be the most applicable to peace support operations. The factors were rephrased as claims. The claims are:

1. Clear strategy connects all the actions.
2. Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down.
3. High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders.
4. High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders.
5. Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common understanding of high level objectives.
6. Local ownership is important/not important.
7. The organization is built on the principles of the host nation.
8. Host nation capacity building is important/not important.
9. Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible.
10. The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment.
11. The organization evolves during the operation.
12. The stakeholders perform as one.
13. Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives.
14. Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries.
15. Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries.
16. Communities are important/not important to success.
17. Strategic alliances are important/not important to success.
18. Networks are important/not important to success.
19. Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders.
20. Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders.
21. Follow-up is an important/not important part of all actions conducted.
22. Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders.
23. Each superior has a specific task.
24. Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports to.

3.4 Summary

Organization is an objective-based description of factors such as supervision, guidance, coordination and authority. Interaction with the environment is one crucial element in an organization. Large organizations tend to be hybrids of several organizational types: for instance matrix, network and functional design.

The 24 factors presented above are subdued to assessment done by professionals to find the most crucial factors to implement into the organization structure. The assessment was

conducted on the fourth survey round. Professionals were asked to assess the importance and occurrence of each factor. The results of this assessment are introduced in section 6.4.

4 Stakeholders and Their Ability in Peace Operations

In this section, peace support operations' stakeholders are presented and their ability to affect the operation is studied. In this context, stakeholder is defined to be understood in the broadest sense of state building.

4.1 Stakeholder Categorization

In early peacekeeping operations, the stakeholders were understood to be the warring factions and the military peacekeepers. As the operations have evolved to be more complex, the idea of stakeholders has evolved simultaneously. Today, the stakeholders have been identified to be all the ones affecting the situation, for instance, the local nation, surrounding nations, possible spoilers within the nations, international community, unions, warring factions, companies, criminals and non-governmental organizations (Stavridis 2016, v; Lehtonen 2009, 12). This ideology is supported in this thesis.

To present an overall idea of the potential stakeholders, it is estimated that over 40,000 non-governmental organizations function internationally. Some hundreds of those are related to peace and security directly. (Evans 2012.)

As a result of this complexity the NGOs have adopted security to be one of their concerns. When assessing an organization, it is essential to understand that today's crises include stakeholders which can be partly civilian, military or a combination of both. (Frerks et al. 2006, 8, 36, 100.) It is neither necessary nor possible to name the individual stakeholders, but it is necessary to categorize them to understand their contribution capabilities towards the peace process.

Evans (2012) categorizes the NGOs into three groups based on their activity. Describing factors are think tanks, advocacy organizations and operational organizations, and some might have activities in several of these groups.

Tsvetkov (2015, 131–156) has recognized the stakeholders in the former Yugoslavia area in a stakeholder analysis. The ones mentioned were local ethnic groups, security forces, political elite, international humanitarian organizations and NGOs inside and outside the country. The analysis discovered that the security forces, political elite and international humanitarian organizations had the highest interest and power to the situation. NGOs within the country had an average influence and the ones outside the country had low influence. The rest of the groups had average influence. By studying this, one can argue that some stakeholders are more capable and therefore more important than others thus the ones with low influence still have the capacity to function even though they are incapable of influencing the situation by themselves. Together they contribute substantially to the situation.

Large stakeholders tend to have more influence than the others. Their influence is directed through all the organizations participated. For instance, United States pays 29 % of the United Nations' peacekeeping budget. This equals 2.5 billion dollars in 2015 (Secretary of State 2014). It is obvious that by contributing the relevant stakeholders want to influence actions. To have more influence, the large contributors have conducted their own fact-finding missions parallel to the official delegations. This is seen as a way to make sure their interests are considered in the reports and recommendations. (Dijkstra 2014, 34.)

One reason for the security forces having a great influence might be that security is one of the crucial issues to address in the beginning. In addition, they are capable of sharing security information, strengthening the capability of local security forces and contributing to the demobilization process. Military is merely self-sustainable and able to support others if it is assessed to be in their best interests. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9; Häikiö 2016.)

Coning (2012, 234–235, 261, 268, 275–276) and Dijkstra (2014, 36) argue that the international community often takes a larger piece from the pie that would essentially be wise and necessary. This creates an ineffective environment for the local system to evolve and enhance its ability to self-organize. These capabilities ought to be developed as main objectives by the international community. Making peace sustainable and to reach operational success a balance should be found between international support and local capacity building. In the end, the peace needs to be established by the locals and should emerge from their capacity instead of the international support.

Shetler-Jones (2016, 99) and Rietjens (2016, 288) are supporting the idea of bringing the local perspective and ownership into the peace process as soon as possible. This should be done because they are the only ones who can make it work in the long term.



Figure 6: Stakeholders and objectives in peace operations (Lehtonen 2009, 12, 38)

Lehtonen has presented the stakeholders and the most important objectives in his thesis as Figure 6 describes.

4.2 Understanding Interaction in Peace Operations

It is a known fact that many interaction levels exist. Levels are often described or divided by artificial categories. When studying the interaction, one needs to bear in mind that individual stakeholders separately have relations with each other. Based on a case-study in Liberia, a model presented in Figure 7 was created. It explains the relations in civil-military context in the framework of non-governmental organizations. In this case, the categories were principled neutralists, pragmatists and supporters. (Frerks et al. 2006, 89–92)

It needs to be understood that the aim is not to have as high level of cooperation as possible since it may have unexpected outcomes. The cooperation needs to be voluntary-based and case-sensitive. By voluntariness the cohesion will become optimal. (Coning 2012, 290.)

Category	Statement of NGO-military association	Type of NGO	Available resources	Geographical	Within the agency	Mandate
Principled neutralists	Threatens humanitarian principles and NGO's security.	Often international NGOs	Often plenty	Capital	Headquarters	Strict and mostly relief
Pragmatists	Benefits outweigh the costs when the situation remains stable.	↕	↕	↕	↕	↕
Supporters	People's needs is the priority.	Often local NGOs	Often few	Rural	Field staff	More diffuse and mostly development

Figure 7: NGO cooperation in civil-military affairs (Frerks et al. 2006, 89–91)

Efforts have been made to develop joint principles to non-governmental organizations for cooperating with the military. For instance, such work was done 2003–2004 to review the original Joint Principles of Operation for NGOs from 1996. In the end, the differences in opinion, mainly between local and international NGOs was overwhelming and many common guidelines were left out from the final version. (Frerks et al. 2006, 89–92.) As Figure 7 clarifies, the local NGOs are often more willing to cooperate than the international ones.

Similarities in the categorization was found also in Afghanistan: the support level raising from the local NGOs was greater in the calm parts of Afghanistan. The overall ideology among the cooperation supporters was that the people's needs override secondary principles related to the non-supporters. It was mentioned that the ones who can have enough resources are capable of being more selective about the stakeholders they cooperate with. This ideology seems to be common in aid agencies' field level. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9, 56–57, 104–105.) An argument can be made that the same idea can be adapted to the less supportive areas in

Afghanistan since the openly supportive role from local NGO towards the military could have been a direct security risk. This supports the idea of security being a foundation for development. It also brings into attention that the attitude can vary between open and closed situations e.g. when outsiders are observing the situation or a closed-doors negotiation.

One main reason for NGOs not to cooperate with the military is the increased security risks, especially if the military is not impartial (Frerks 2016, 33). The military does not, however, usually have this problem since they are the ones providing security and supplying their own force protection. Delivering security is one reason why the peacekeepers are more popular among the locals than the NGOs (Frerks et al. 2006, 9).

Another, more comprehensive, model of interaction levels and relationship types was presented by Coning and Friis (2011, 258). The model takes all the stakeholders into account and recognizes six levels of cooperation: unity, integration, cooperation, coordination, coexisting and competing. These levels can be applied to intra-agency, whole-of-government, inter-agency and international-local relationships. A clarification is presented in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Interaction and relations in four environments (Coning & Friis 2011, 253–261)

Intra-agency can be understood to be one ministry and its section. Whole-of-government can be seen as the ministries of a country. Inter-agency signifies for instance interaction between NATO and EU. International-local interaction can be understood as the local state and international actors. One needs to understand that interaction levels between stakeholders vary case by case and peace operation environments are often hybrids of them all. (Coning & Friis 2011, 253–261.)

It has been acknowledged that the military seldom has anything against working with the non-governmental organizations and the collaboration is supported. This is probably because military tends to see that they cannot solve all the situations and others might perform better in their field of expertise. It might also have an effect that the military is often under the operation's umbrella unlike the NGOs and therefore understands the main objectives more thoroughly. One concern stated by an NGO representative is that the military wants to use them in operating instead of cooperating with them. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9, 58, 104.)

It has been argued that some operational lines or tasks might have more potential for cooperation than others. For instance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are seen as potential as well as supporting the rule of law, election support and the resettlement of people (Frerks et al. 2006, 9).

As an overall idea of cooperation, it can be summed up that stakeholders seem to cooperate when it is in their best interest (Rietjens & Lucius 2016, 2). This brings into attention that by supporting the understanding of the common objectives and enabling the stakeholders to voluntarily select the level of cooperation the outcome might be more effective than it is today.

4.3 Ways to Enhance Interaction

Several reasons have been identified to hamper the civil-military cooperation. Winslow (2002) recognized the five major ones to be:

- differences in organizational structure and culture,
- ways of solving the tasks,
- the tasks themselves,
- definition of success and time frames, and
- ability to control information and the control of resources.

Coning (2016, 22) sees some similarities in the hampering factors, some of them being differences in the values and principles, ways of implementing tasks, ways of understanding the best interest in the short- and long-term and how it corresponds to the comprehensiveness or just to the agency. Obviously by mitigating these hampering factors the cooperation might be enhanced.

Coning (2012, 303; 2016, 22–23) also mentions that a forced cooperation might actually be counterproductive and decrease the cohesion between stakeholders. This is supported by Frerks et al. (2006, 8) by acknowledging that an effort to integrate the actions does exist but forced structures may be counterproductive.

According to Frerks et al. (2006, 8; 2016, 42), a flexible multi-level cooperation before the deployment might be one way to support the cooperation. Thynne and Cherne (2016, 74) and Lehtonen (2009) all agree by stating that achieving overall objectives demands for close interaction between the stakeholders. They highlight the meaning of joint training, education and exercises. This has been implemented by the peace operations personnel training centers.

Information has been seen as a way to add interaction. This also means that the information flow to stakeholders without severe restrictions supports the possibility for cooperation through interaction (Coning 2012, 268; Seppen & Lucius 2016, 58). Also, understanding the information on what will likely happen if the cooperation is neglected might enhance the will to cooperate (Coning 2012, 262; Pohjanheimo 2012, 164–168).

The understanding of overall objectives naturally enhances cohesion. The stakeholders need to see how they contribute to the strategic objective. The closer stakeholders can be voluntarily attached to the core, the better the cohesion. (Coning 2012, 263.)

It has been argued that close ties with the stakeholders can be created and supported also by affecting the physical environment. This means having the offices and workplaces as close to each other as possible. (Seppen & Lucius 2016, 58.) One way of applying this could be arranging the offices so that the ones having, for instance, the same line of operations share the same building, the same floor or even the same office. This differentiates from the current way where stakeholders tend to have their own camps, bases and buildings. As the intra-agency cooperation is often more natural than the inter-agency cooperation, it might be something worth testing. This supports the idea of treating people as equals and, as a result creating a better understanding and trust between the stakeholders (Kitzen & Vogelsang 2016, 87). This would enhance the capability to share information more efficiently.

One identified challenge has been the militaries' rotation cycle. It is seen to be too quick to establish natural relationships with the stakeholders. Basically, the relationship building starts from zero once or twice a year. (Frerks et al. 2006, 57.) This could be managed by introducing different rotation rhythms and planning the rotation on a personnel-level in a different way.

From the leadership perspective, everything should be done to support the mutual trust and involving the stakeholders (Olsthoorn & Soeters 2016, 246). Leaders should have a mandate that allows flexibility to give them a better possibility to see and use the possibilities given to them on the ground (Frerks et al. 2006, 8).

4.4 Summary

Based on the literature, the stakeholders can be organized into groups as described in Figure 9. The main groups are international organization and local and international stakeholders. International stakeholders include foreign stakeholders, i.e. states.



Figure 9: Peace support operations' stakeholders

Each stakeholder has relations with others and therefore presenting them is difficult in a generic sense. In addition, the relations are in constant movement and dependent on the environment. Therefore, each case or operation should be assessed individually and the assessment is to be updated regularly.

The ability of stakeholders to affect the operation is studied in section 6.5. Their power and interest related to operational lines will be assessed by professionals and a list of influential and willing stakeholders is presented. It needs to be understood that within a formed group lie many smaller groups causing variation within the group.

5 Methods and Timetable

This section describes how the thesis was done. Firstly, the methods used are introduced and the reason for using them is argued. Secondly, the overall idea on how theory and practice is bonded together is introduced. Thirdly, the timetable is presented.

5.1 Methods used to Answer the Research Questions

This thesis is a survey study and it uses qualitative content analysis (Hirsijärvi, Remes & Sajavaara 2005, 125–125, 151–155, 182–183). The process from data collecting to analyzing and concluding is described below.

Data Collection

Three approaches to collect data were used. The first approach was through literature and articles. Second approach was a survey to experts and the third was interviewing experts. The data collected by these three approaches was triangulated to find the best possible solution. (Hirsijärvi et al. 2005, 180–208.) If data differentiated between the approaches, the cases were evaluated individually.

Literature was primarily used to gain general information on the research topic. Articles were studied to find more specific information on some themes of the study. The value of the articles was considered critically. An effort was made to use the most updated data available which had been subdued to peer review. Several article databases, for instance Scopus, Laurea's Finna, Finnish National Defence Force's Linneanet and Google Scholar, were used to find material.

Looking into current operations' organigrams was avoided during the data collecting. This was done to minimize the possibility of finding solutions from wrong places.

Survey was selected to be the main source of empiricism. This was done to reach as many potential experts around the world as possible. Survey was a suitable way to collect data with the designed questions and to enable the analysis right after collection. A positive side was that every respondent received the information as it was and therefore they had as similar details to answer the survey as possible. If the data had been collected by face to face interviews the answers would have been more versatile due to the nature of conversation. Surveys enabled the respondents to answer the questions whenever and wherever. The survey was planned so that the total time consumption per respondent would be around an hour divided into five parts.

Survey Introduction

The survey was conducted in five rounds following the progress of the data collected from the literature. Each round consisted of 1–10 questions taking a total of 5–20 minutes to answer. The respondents were given 2–4 weeks to answer each round. Each respondent answered by using his or her own digital devices in a self-selected location. The survey, as a whole, was conducted within a year.

The respondents were selected by their experience. The total number of people given the possibility to participate was nearly sixty. The people participating in each round varied from eight to sixteen. Each round had partly different respondents. To mitigate the effects on the results, the rounds were independent and each had their own theme.




Figure 10: Demonstration of the survey rounds

The survey's idea is demonstrated in Figure 10. The respondents did not know of each other during the survey. They could suggest a new person to participate but they could not find out if that person participated or not. The raw data was given to the respondents after each round and they could comment on it. They were not given the information of which answer each participant had given. The aim was not to create unity but to find opinions on the subjects.

This had similarities related to the Delfi-method. The respondents might have had an idea of each other participating and analyzing was done by qualitative content analysis and not by

the group itself. However, unity of opinion was not demanded in the end and therefore it was different from Delfi. Delfi-method was considered to be used in this study but it was assessed to be too burdensome and time-consuming for this occasion.

The answers were collected and analyzed by Webropol-tools in the internet. A thorough description of the questions is given in section 6 and in Appendix 2.

The interviews were conducted by e-mail. E-mail interviews were structured and usually related to some details where additional information was needed.

The survey participants were treated anonymously and their answers cannot be connected to their identity. The selected people had top level experience on peace operations and working with the stakeholders. They were from international organizations and governmental organizations. Unfortunately, none were from non-governmental organizations. The respondents had years of experience from civilian and/or military peace operations. A detailed respondent information is provided in Appendix 1.

Analyzing Methods

The analyzing method used was qualitative content analysis. Analyzing was done by two approaches to validate the information. The two approaches were content isolation in numerical sense and content analysis in a qualitative sense. The principles of data collection and analysis are presented in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Data collecting and analyzing

This paragraph introduces the qualitative content analysis. The data collected from sources has been isolated in fragments and thematized. The thematized data was connected and developed into information. (Hirsijärvi et al. 2005, 209–215.) In this stage the sections were individual so that no connections were made between them. After this, the information was analyzed and conclusions were made. From the conclusions, it was possible to develop knowledge and answer the research question.

This paragraph introduces the content isolation. The data collected was analyzed by text-mining tools. The automatic analyze informed which words were often seen close to each other. After this all the answers were read one by one and each of them was categorized under its main theme e.g. lack of cooperation. A word-group was created below each theme. The program automatically calculated the number of times an individual theme was mentioned within the answers. This gave an idea of which themes were dominant or submissive in the answers.

The content isolation and qualitative content analysis were used as separate tools. The isolation was always secondly used following the qualitative analysis. Since the analysis was made by the same person, it is possible that the isolation has been affected by the qualitative analysis.

5.2 Dialogue between the Theory and Empiricism

This thesis is based on an idea that one part leads to another. Therefore, one finding is a building block for the next one. This is introduced in Figure 12.

Firstly, in the first theory part an idea of peace operations was studied and its success factors were established based on theory. The success factors were closely tied to operational lines. Secondly, a draft structure for a peace operation was created and possible risks towards the operation were identified by the survey rounds 1–3. Risks were assessed to be the failure factors towards the operation. The risks were identified, categorized manually and their root cause was established by five-whys tool. Thirdly, as an individual theory, the organizational theories and organizational success enablers were studied in the second theory part. Based on literature, 24 principles were selected to be most suitable for the organization of a peace operations. Fourthly, the 24 presented principles were subdued to peace operation experts. They were to assess how important a principle is and how often it occurs in relation to peace operations. Based on the answers, the key principles to establish the organization were found. Fifthly, the stakeholders to be involved into the organization were studied through theory. Through this phase, it was possible to determine the stakeholder groups present in peace operations. Sixthly, the respondents were to assess the power and interest of the stakeholders in relation to each operational line. The guidance was to conduct the assessment based on their views of the stakeholder performing at its realistic best. The assessment was

done by pointing a place on a fourhold which had interest on X-axis and power on Y-axis. The results were scaled to numbers between 1 and 100. The averages were used when forming charts. In this phase, the most influential and willing stakeholder groups were recognized. By this recognition, the ones that should be involved in the operation’s organization can be pointed out.




Figure 12: Interaction between theory and survey rounds

The main themes for the rounds were:

- First round: Defining the strategy and end-state of comprehensive approaches.
- Second round: Defining the operational lines for the operation.
- Third round: Defining the risks related to reaching the end-state.
- Third round: Finding applicable organizational theories to be implemented into peace operation.
- Fifth round: Defining the applicable stakeholders’ power and interest to participate into peace operations.

Each survey round consisted of two parts. The first part was a collection of background information and the second was based on the selected theme. Anonymized basic information is presented in Appendix 1 and the format of the overall survey is presented in Appendix 2. The number of respondents in the survey rounds was low so the results are not statistically significant and therefore the data is analyzed by qualitative content analysis. In addition, statistical methods such as averages were utilized. One needs to understand that the numbers presented are merely descriptive and provide an idea of the tools used.

After the argued organizational model was created it was subdued to evaluation. This is called the “Devil’s Advocate” method. The aim is to understand the weaknesses, problems and negative aspects of the model. (Lewis, Goodman & Fant 1995, 200–201.) A possibility to comment was given to all survey respondents and interviewed persons and their opinions are taken into consideration as a part of the criticism.

5.3 Timetable to Answer the Research Questions

The timetable is presented in Figure 13. Data collection and analysis was done within 2016. Reporting was started within 2016 and concluded together with evaluation in 2017.

In the beginning of 2016, a project plan to conduct the thesis was established. The need for the research task was identified by IECEU project and confirmed by theoretical and empirical approaches within the first half of the year 2016. The research task was further developed to be a research question and divided into three sub-question pairs in early 2016. Each pair had an individual theme. The theory of these themes was studied in its equivalent section. Data collecting for the theory sections was started immediately after the sub-questions were established.




Figure 13: Timeline and data collection

As shown in Figure 13, the empirical part followed the theory collecting of each equivalent section. Each survey round was a separate one partly answering a particular sub-question.

The conclusions were made during the last quarter of 2016. Finalizing the report was conducted between November 2016 and January 2017.

6 Survey: Bonding Theory to Peace Operation Practice

This section presents the survey round by round. Each round is studied in its own sub-section. Firstly, a reason for the survey round is presented. Secondly, the findings and analyzed data are presented in a table and figure format. The findings of the qualitative content analysis are seen underlined in the tables. Content isolation is introduced in the figures together with the used word groups. Rounds from one to three were analyzed as described above. Rounds four and five were adapted into numerical data and therefore averages are used. The averages are considered to be descriptions of the outcome. Since the number of respondents was low, the averages are not to be considered as absolute values.

6.1 First Round: Comprehensiveness in Peace Operations

First round searched for a clarification on the terms commonly used for comprehensive crisis management and a view to the end-state of an operation. This was deemed necessary in order to establish a common ground for the following rounds and to build up the basic structure of an operation. The basic information of the respondents is presented in Appendix 1. The number of respondents was 16 in the first round.

6.1.1 First round: Defining Strategy and End-state for a Peace Operation

The answers related to comprehensive crisis management and comprehensive approach appear to be mixed with each other. No clear distinction can be drawn between them. For instance, the answers of ID 1, ID 8 and ID 10 on question one compared to those of ID 9 and ID14 to question two have many similarities. See Table 7 for more details. As it was presented earlier in the second section, crisis management has had many generations and many terms exist. They are easily mixed up, especially when organizations have a similar idea but they use an individual term for it. For instance, comprehensive approach is a term related to the European Union's crisis prevention and management. The term was recognized by one respondent (Survey, Question 2-ID 9).

A wide definition was adopted for this thesis because it was needed in order to include aspects of state-building. Based on answers on questions one and two, the idea of comprehensive crisis management was defined as connecting important stakeholders to achieve a common goal by using all relevant capabilities in all phases of the crisis as mentioned in Table 7.

Q1: What does Comprehensive Crisis Management mean to you?	Q2: What does Comprehensive Approach mean to you?
ID 1: “ <u>All the actions</u> taken together to help and support people in need.”	ID 3: “ <u>All the possible elements as well as means</u> are taken into consideration and they most appropriate of them taken into use.”
ID 8: “Comprehensive Crisis Management means ... <u>coordination and interoperability between different actors</u> and crisis management Instruments [...] <u>at ALL stages</u> of engagement in a post-conflict or crisis situation [...]”	ID 9: “ <u>All possible stakeholders</u> (civilians, military, politicians) should participate to the effort [...]”
ID 10: “ <u>Combining and integrating vast range of tools, means and expertise</u> in order to support a nation or region to cope a security crisis. Also the goals are widely spread throughout the society and administration in the crisis region.”	ID 14: “Comprehensive approach is a <u>means to develop a coordination and response to a crisis by all relevant actors involved.</u> ”

Table 7: A sample of collected answers on questions 1 and 2 (Survey 2016, Q1–Q2)

Answers on the third question highlighted the end-state to be a sustainable peace, achievement of a functioning society and a limited need for international support (Survey 2016, Q3). This is clearly stated in the answers introduced below:

“A functioning society where people basic needs are taken care of and where we have a functioning administration to support the people, so that they have safe environment.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, Question 3, ID 2.)

“State structures have been established and they are able to work professionally with a limited international assistance.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, Question 3, ID 3.)

“[...] a situation where the institutions of the country in question can take care of their own functioning, provide the necessary services for their own people, are free from interference by outsiders, where the basic human rights of the people can be guaranteed by the institutions and services and where a certain degree of human security is in place.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, Question 3, ID 8.)

The results were connected to theory from the third section and are presented in the Figure 15.

As mentioned in methods section, the data was also analyzed by content isolation. Based on the isolation it can be argued that questions one and two had similarities. The most often

mentioned themes, i.e. word groups, were “all stakeholders”, “all actions” and “common goals”. This finding supports the definition of comprehensive crisis management introduced above.




Figure 14: Content isolation of questions 1–3 (Survey 2016)

Based on the content isolation of the third question, the themes, i.e. word groups, that were most often mentioned were limited international support, functioning society and sustainable peace. This is directly supporting the qualitative analysis conducted and presented above.

6.2 Second Round: Peace Operation’s Operational Lines

The second round presented a suggestion for the selected strategy and end-state to the respondents and gave them a possibility to comment. The suggestions were developed based on the first round and are presented in Figure 15. Based on the suggestions, the respondents were to define the lines of operation, i.e. areas of interest. Respondents had the possibility to name as many as they wanted. The basic information of the respondents is presented in Appendix 1. The number of respondents was 14.




Figure 15: Suggested end-state and strategy (Survey 2016)

6.2.1 Assessing the End-state, Strategy and Defining the Operational Lines

The suggested end-state and strategy were commonly seen as suitable but still received critique of being too vague. Some answers related to the critique are presented below:

“End-state is unrealistic and too vaste [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 6.)

“The End State is clear and even somehow measurable to assess the achievements of the operation, but still it is rather generic. I would have preferred a more precise End state. The same goes for the described strategy [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 10.)

“The end state is much too ambitious and all-inclusive for any mission / operation to be able to fulfil within its mandate, resources or time. It includes basically the whole state building of a post-conflict state including political, social, security and governance development [...] Strategy, too, is rather ambiguous[...]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 18.)

ID 18 presents critique towards the suggestions by mentioning that it includes all the aspects of state-building. This can be argued to be a positive critique since a generic model was the aim.

The respondent ID 13 highlighted that the operation is not black and white and many shades of grey exist. Therefore, it needs to be understood that each situation is different and the aim for this round was to develop as generic a model as possible. The broad model was used

to avoid missing crucial factors during the upcoming rounds. ID 13's answer is presented below.

“The end-state is not a binary decision: yes or no, 0 or 1, black or white. It's rather a set of shades of gray [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 13.)

A total of 118 operational lines were suggested. Answers were separated and themed under generalized operational lines. The analysis was done manually and by content isolation. The result of the analysis is introduced in Figure 16. The lines are generalized so that some include two lines. This was done to keep the survey rounds less time consuming and burdensome for the respondents.



Figure 16: End-state, Strategy and Operational lines combined by manual analysis

The data was also analyzed with content isolation to test the outcome of the manual analysis. The information is presented in Figure 17. Each line presents a theme, i.e. word groups which are presented in the same figure. The most common ones were security, management, governance, development and political system. Since some generalization and merging was done in the manual analysis, the result can be seen to support it. The content isolation also indicates the importance of separate operational lines. Security can be argued to be one of the most important ones. Merging governance and political system raises it to be among the most important ones. Nevertheless, one needs to remember that the result is merely describing the importance and the respondents were not asked to assess the importance.




Figure 17: Content isolation of question 5 (Survey 2016)

6.3 Third Round: Risks in Peace Operations

Third round introduced the operational lines to the respondents in the form as they were mentioned in Figure 16. The respondents were given a task to identify the risks that might hamper the overall mission success. The respondents had the possibility to name as many as they wanted. The information of respondents is presented in Appendix 1. The number of respondents was 9.

6.3.1 Third Round: Root Causes to Hamper the Operational Success

The respondents recognized 76 risks. The categorization was done manually and by content isolation as shown in Figure 18. After the categorization was done, each risk was assessed by using a tool called five-whys⁴. By this, the most crucial risks were identified to be stakeholders' own interests, lack of training for the stakeholders, the situation not comprehensively understood, focusing on the short-term, too cautious an attitude towards action and the multicultural environment as a whole.

⁴ Five-whys is a common tool to understand the root cause of something. Addressing the original problem by asking why it occurs and repeating it for the answer for total of five times one is closer to the root cause.




Figure 18: Risk categorization by content isolation (Survey 2016, Q6)

The identified risks and the root causes are used to support the forming of an organization. Some risks can be mitigated by organizational design. For instance, deciding jointly upon the strategic objectives will increase the level of commitment. This can be seen as positive in the context of stakeholders having their own agenda and of the overall lack of situational awareness.

6.4 Fourth Round: Applying Organization Theories to Peace Operations

The fourth round introduced factors from organizational theories and peace operations literature. The respondents were to assess how important a factor is and how often it occurs in peace operations. Each question had two parts: A. for importance and B. for occurrence. The assessment was done by using numbers from 1 to 5 and averages were used to create the charts. The respondents were given a possibility to comment on the selected factors. The fourth round had 8 respondents. The numeric data is not absolute and the numbers presented are to be understood as a description of the situation. Nevertheless, the conclusions are used to support the forming of an organization.

The factors were themed under the following categories:

- Strategy and objectives: Q7.1–Q7.5
- Local ownership and host nation: Q7.6–Q7.10
- Evolving organization: Q7.11, Q7.21
- Pooling, sharing and cooperation: Q7.12–Q7.15, Q7.22
- Organization: Q7.16–Q7.20, Q7.23–Q7.24

6.4.1 Fourth Round: Organizational Factors' Importance and Occurrence

The assessed factors are presented in order of importance in Figure 19. Almost all the selected factors were assessed to be very or extremely important although none was assessed to occur often in operations. Therefore, they are introduced into the organization's structure in order of thematized importance presented in Figure 20.




Figure 19: Importance and occurrence of selected factors (Survey 2016, Q7)

The respondents were given a possibility to comment on the factors presented. The comments were analyzed by qualitative content analysis. Content isolation was not used since only 5 respondents had commented. Some comments are introduced in the following paragraphs.




Figure 20: Importance and occurrence of themes (Survey 2016, Q7)

As evolving organization in Figure 20 is ranked the highest in importance the first result is that the organization needs to be able to evolve in the environment. This is clearly indicated by the factors 11 and 21 in Figure 19. It is worth noticing that evolving organization ranks highest in the occurrence while the occurrence of follow-up is more rare. This result was supported by an expert commenting on the issue:

“[...] it is also important that the operation is adaptable to the changing environment [...] changes in roles, responsibilities, and sub-objectives during the operation cycle is necessary.” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 20)

The second result is that the stakeholders need to be able to participate to the strategy and objective establishment to better function as a team. This includes that the objectives need to be clearly stated top-down. This is supported by factors 1–5 in Figure 19. The occurrence of stating the objectives top-down was the only factor in this category assessed to occur more often than sometimes, receiving a value of 3.25. The rest were assessed to occur between sometimes and rarely.

The third result argues that local environment needs to have an influence on the actions as well as its capability needing to be developed at all times. One of the largest variations was within this category. The importance varied from 3.4 to 4.6 and the occurrence from 2.63 to 3.13. The lowest rank in importance was assessed to be factor 7, meaning building the organization on the principles of the host nation. This can be interpreted so that in some level the western organization models are seen adaptable. Since the occurrence of all the factors in this category are close to value 3 it can be argued that some ways to reach effectiveness are available and some can be implemented through organization.

The fourth result is that different levels of interaction between stakeholders is essential. This is visible in the factors 14 and 15 in Figure 19. It is interesting that the occurrence of this

category is the lowest when considering the average. One interesting detail is that factor 12, meaning the stakeholders to perform as one, was ranked second lowest on importance reaching a value of 3.4. This category indicates that interaction and even sharing resources should be done more efficiently but the stakeholders can perform individually. This theme was commented on by experts:

“Cooperation shall take place where appropriate [...] Capability to manage and lead the complexity should be at the heart [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 20)

“[...] Stakeholder participation supports good governance, citizenship, and accountability and promotes innovation, responsiveness, and sustainability, linked directly to development effectiveness [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 14)

“[...] Narrow-minded, black and white leadership effectively hindered cooperation exceeding agency boundaries and, thus, greater efficiency of the organization/operation [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 15)

The fifth result is that the organization should utilize all different forms of organizing and the unity of command is not crucial. Factors 16, 17 and 18 in Figure 19 support the idea of having strategic alliances, communities and networks. Factor 24, meaning having a clear unity of command, was assessed to be least important among all the factors, reaching a value of 2.71 on importance. Factor 20 is interesting since it recognizes the need to share information openly but simultaneously ranks second lowest on occurrence by reaching a value of 2.25. This result is supported by an expert by stating:

“[...] Partnerships with more diverse institutions including NGOs, community-based organizations, and foundations will become central to planning, financing, and implementing operations [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 14)

“Matrix management is sometimes the best option [...]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 11)

It is worth noticing factors 3, 5, 20 and 22 in Figure 19. Firstly, they indicate that joint development of high level objectives is extremely important and understanding the objectives enhances cooperation. Secondly, it is recognized that it is very important to plan, conduct and follow actions together with all the stakeholders. Thirdly, the open flow of information was assessed to be very important. The factors mentioned are the lowest ranking in their occurrence, reaching values from 2.25 to 2.5. It can be argued that the occurrence of the

mentioned factors is intertwined with each other. By conducting joint planning, the information flow will be enhanced, the objectives will be better understood, the will to cooperate enhances and together these contribute to the will to jointly plan, conduct and follow the actions. This was supported by an expert:

“[...] Joint Planning, Information sharing and effective cooperation among stakeholders need to be improved!” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 14)

6.5 Fifth Round: The power and interest of the stakeholders

The fifth round introduced the stakeholders based on literature and on a modified approach to operational lines. The modification was based on the the answers from the second round and on literature. This section introduces the stakeholders to be implemented into each operational line based on their power and interest. The fifth round had 9 respondents and they are introduced in Appendix 1. One needs to understand that the results are only describing the idea and contributing by introducing the stakeholder groups. The numbers presented are based on averages and are not absolute. The results were used to support the organization forming.

6.5.1 Fifth Round: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards operational lines

By understanding the stakeholders in the environment, one can map them. This can be utilized to understand the complex nature of the environment. By studying the stakeholders and assessing them, the ones enabling success can be found. It needs to be understood that most of the groups presented below are not actual stakeholders. Each stakeholder agency or organization is an individual and their power and interest differs greatly within the group they represent. For instance, local people can be further divided into smaller groups based on e.g. ethnicity or religion (Tsvetkov 2016).

The power and interest of stakeholders in relation to each operational line is presented below. The power and interest related to management is introduced on the left in Figure 21. The figure is sorted based on power. The one having the highest power is presented on the top and the one with lowest power is on the bottom. The level of interest related to the operational line is expressed side by side with the power on the left side of the Figure 21.

As mentioned above, the stakeholders can be mapped if they are properly assessed. One way to map the stakeholders is presented on the right in side of Figure 21. The figure shows the ranking of the stakeholders based on power and interest. The high ranking ones are placed on the top in Figure 21. The colors are used to visualize the same stakeholders. The shades are presenting similar groups where blue ones are international groups, yellow ones are local and red ones are possibly having a negative effect on the situation. By analyzing Figure 21, one

can find out the crucial stakeholder groups related to management. In this thesis, the crucial ones were deemed to be the ones with power and the ones whose power should be enhanced to enable sustainable peace, e.g. local governmental organizations.




Figure 21: The power and interest of stakeholders towards management (Survey 2016, Q24)

Based on Figure 21 one can argue that three most powerful stakeholders on management are the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. They are all international organizations. The following three are local groups of spoilers, conflict parties and political elite. The three most interested stakeholders are the United Nations, the European Union and OSCE. They are all international organizations as well, but when reflected towards power factor, NATO is assessed to have much lower level of interest towards the management than the other high ranking entities on power factor. Places 4–6 on interest factor are again local groups and, to be specific, local governmental organizations, people and political elite. It is worth noticing that local people rank low on power but quite high on interest. A similar argument can be made on local companies and local non-governmental organizations. Another issue worth mentioning is that if the international groups are not present, three out of five most powerful stakeholders are possibly having a negative effect on the situation. This needs to be considered when establishing the organization. As an exception in this operational line, the possibly negative stakeholders have a high interest towards management.




Figure 22: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards security and rule of law (Survey 2016, Q12)

As Figure 22 presents, most of the stakeholders with high interest tend to have low power within this operational line. The stakeholders acting in the root level in the local society, i.e. local people and local NGOs, seem to have the highest interest on the security and the rule of law. Potentially negatively affecting stakeholders have the lowest interest to contribute but they rank within the seven highest power holders in the listing. If this is not mitigated in an early stage, it will have an effect on the operation. When participating in the peace process, the possible negative stakeholders might have a great effect on security and the rule of law. It must be understood that some individuals in the mentioned stakeholder groups might be a part of several groups e.g. within political elite there might be people who also belong to the spoilers or conflict parties groups.

Another interesting factor in Figure 21 is the difference between NATO's power and interest. NATO is considered to be the most powerful stakeholder and yet it ranks in the middle on interest. This line could easily be understood to be NATO's core business within peace operations so the low interest level was not expected.




Figure 23: The power and interest of stakeholders towards governance and political system (Survey 2016, Q14)

Figure 23 introduces the first presented operational line where the local stakeholder group ranks highest together with the United Nations. The differences are marginal. This operational line follows the previous ones in the sense that the possibly negative stakeholders have a high power but low interest. What is more, the local stakeholders having high interest tend to have low power.




Figure 24: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards development and economics (Survey 2016, Q20)

A new factor on this operational line is the high power of foreign stakeholders e.g. companies and governmental organizations. Another issue is that the possibly negative stakeholders have fallen in the middle on power but they are still the lowest on interest. A positive factor is that if the international stakeholders are deleted from the charts, the high-ranking stakeholders are locals or at least possibly having a positive impact on the situation. On the other hand, it can be discussed whether the foreign companies have a positive or a negative impact on the development. The top two on power are clearly ahead of the others. This operational line and humanitarian aid are the only ones with such a clear difference.




Figure 25: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards human rights (Survey 2016, 16)

The ones ranking high on power in relation to human rights tend to have a high variance on their interest. Based on Figure 23, it appears that the ones who are mostly affected by a poor human rights situation are the most interested in it. For instance, local political elite has high power but low interest. This could be because they probably are not the ones suffering from a poor situation and therefore are not interested in it. Another group which is clearly interested in human rights is the international community. This could be because honoring human rights is often one of their core values. A factor worth mentioning is that the companies, both local and foreign, are low on interest and power related to human rights issues. It was surprising how low the interest among the local companies is since local people and non-governmental organizations rank high on interest.




Figure 26: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards humanitarian aid (Survey 2016, Q18)

The United Nations and the European Union have clearly the highest power towards humanitarian aid, as seen from Figure 26. Otherwise the operational line follows the typical theme where the ones suffering the consequences of the crisis are very interested but low on power. The possible negative stakeholders are ranking in the middle on power but a small distinction can be made since the local spoilers and conflict parties have more power than foreign entities. One factor worth mentioning is the low power of foreign people and their average interest on the situation. It can be argued that the lack of information decreases the interest of the people and lack of means to contribute decreases the power factor. If a tool to contribute existed and people would receive more correct information from the area this group's potential would be much higher.




Figure 27: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards media and civil society (Survey 2016, Q22)

Media and civil society is the operational line which has the highest level of interest as a whole. It can be discussed whether the overall support on this operational line is a bit higher than towards the others. Still, the same trends apply on this line as well.

Based on the findings from all the operational lines the following issues can be argued. Firstly, the United Nations and the European Union have a high influence on the success of the operation. Other international organizations' influence varies more based on the operational line. Secondly, also the potentially negative stakeholders, e.g. spoilers and conflict parties, have a high influence on the success. This indicates that their capability to negatively affect the situation should be mitigated as soon as possible. By doing so the peace process has a better possibility to success. For instance, transforming the conflict parties into political parties is mentioned earlier to be an important factor to success. Thirdly, many stakeholders that function on the root level of the crisis tend to have low power but high interest. As stated earlier, building local capacity is argued to be important. This can be seen as a possibility to use means of teaching and mentoring to build up the capacity by the international community.

To support the overall success, the ones ranking high on power and the ones who should carry the weight of the crisis in the end are to be in the lead of the operation. This combination is called a core in this thesis. The core can vary between operational lines and regionally but to

support the overall understanding of the objectives it is crucial that the ones leading are present in all levels and areas.

7 Developing the Organization for Peace Operation

This section provides a suggestion for a peace operation organization. The organization will be developed based on the findings of sub-questions. A synthesis of theory and empiricism is introduced in this section.

7.1 Synthesis of overall findings

Research Questions	Sections of discussion	Short answer to research question
1a. What is a peace operation?	Section 2 Section 6.1	Combining all the stakeholders and their capabilities to achieve sustainable peace and a functioning society which needs only limited international support.
1b. What are the agents of success in peace operations?	Section 2 Section 6.2 Section 6.3	Understanding the situation thoroughly and planning a solution together with crucial stakeholders on the basis of self-sustainable peace. All the implemented actions should build up local capacity to function as a nation and to move further from the possibility of relapse.
1c. What is an organization?	Section 3	Organization is a description of e.g. authority, responsibility, structure, information flow and reporting. Organization always has a task to accomplish and it should be built to achieve it as efficiently as possible.
1d. What kind of organization best supports interaction?	Section 3 Section 6.4	Hybrid organization which inholds the main ideas of planning, acting and reviewing issues together. Supporting voluntary and self-emerging evolution of the organization is a positive factor. Open information flow is seen to support these issues.
1e. Who are the stakeholders in a peace operation?	Section 4	This has to be assessed case by case and a useful generic model is very hard to produce. The stakeholders can be divided into three main groups which are international organizations, local stakeholders and international stakeholders. These can be further divided into 20 groups. It needs to be understood that a successful operation must recognize the ones it needs to involve.
1f. What are the power and interest of the stakeholders to affect an operation?	Section 4 Section 6.5	The power and interest tends to vary based on the operational lines they were compared to. Commonly the ones who should be in charge were considered to be low on power and high on interest. The international organizations were often ranked high on power and interest. Possibly negatively affecting stakeholders tend to have high power but low interest.

Table 8: Answers to research questions

More thorough answers to sub-questions are delivered in the following paragraphs.

Peace operations and enablers for success

Peace support operations have seen five generations to date (Kenkel 2013). The latest have been identified to be more complex than the earlier ones. It needs to be understood that each operation is implemented in a different environment and therefore is unique. The unique situation needs to be assessed comprehensively to meet the needs of the supported nation.

The latest models of peace operations are based on system approach. It needs to be seen as a way to understand the situation more comprehensively. The causalities tend to work in unexpected ways and system approach should not be seen as a way to ensure success by design. It is impossible to foresee primary, secondary or tertiary effects of actions.

One crucial aspect of inefficiency is argued to depend on the lack of coherence. This means that the actions are not coordinated in the most effective way causing ineffective use of resources and ineffectiveness in reaching goals. The ultimate consequence is prolongation of the crisis.

This thesis addressed a situation in the most challenging environment where a comprehensive state building needs to be implemented. Therefore, the state-building's structure was set as vast as possible and the organization was to be able to take the overall responsibility of the situation.

Since the local capability to maintain sustainable peace is one crucial objective, their capability to manage the situation should be developed from the beginning. This demands for local will to achieve peace and, on the other hand, for international will to build local capacity so that it reaches a sufficient level.

The mandate sets the fundamentals for the operation and gives guidelines for strategy development. The strategy is developed after the objectives have been set based on the mandate. To enable positive interaction between core stakeholders, they should be given the possibility to participate in the objective development and in the work before defining the objects. If the core stakeholders are not agreeing on the objectives it will be more difficult to enable positive and holistic approach in the operation.

Organizational enablers for success

Several factors to be considered in the organization forming were found. The most crucial factors are presented in the following paragraphs together with a suggestion on how they should be implemented in the organization.

The first factor was to mitigate the will of the stakeholders to pursue objectives related to their own interests. This can be done by joint development of common objectives. Another way is to enable their own interest-based objectives to be connected to the overall actions in

a functioning manner. By this, the rate of all the actions and projects being connected to the overall objectives should rise. The third way to mitigate this is to make sure that everyone understands the results of the conducted actions based on their own interest, i.e. prolonging the crisis.

The second factor was to mitigate lack of training among the stakeholders. This causes them to work inefficiently together and to not see the environment as a crucial actor. It is obvious that joint training should be a part of the culture and that in the long run this would contribute to the situation. When a “performing as one” ideology is implemented, it requires the stakeholders to understand and respect each others. One critical way to engage this is enabling and making interaction and making stakeholders to work with each other.

The third factor is defective knowledge of the situation. Without information, the knowledge cannot be developed. Therefore, a crucial way towards a better knowledge is sharing information. This can be supported by organizational structures which are argued to increase the information flow. Another way to support information flow is to establish information networks which are openly spread throughout the area. This would enable the ones with access to reach more data and information and therefore have a possibility to understand the situation better and possibly contribute to it. Obviously, the information sharing includes risks as well.

The fourth factor is to develop a self-correcting organization. This can be understood to be an evolutionary method to alter the organization based on the needs. The organization’s evolution needs to be based on voluntary actions from stakeholders and different levels of interaction.

The fifth factor is to understand that the structure of large organizations tends to be a hybrid of several organization types. This supports the operation’s versatile needs.

Interaction and relations as enablers for success

Operations have many stakeholders and therefore it is not useful to name most of them since they are different in each operation. In this thesis, the main groups were categorized to be international organizations, local stakeholders and international stakeholders.

Each stakeholder has relations to the ones it interacts with regardless of the interaction level. The relations vary according to the environment. It is a complex task to define the true relations and therefore only a generic idea of the relations is introduced in this thesis.

The power and interest of the stakeholders to affect the operation varies greatly. A generic model implies that an operation needs core stakeholders which are responsible for achieving the common objectives. The core should be developed bearing in mind that the locals have a

high level of interest to the situation and, in the end, they are the ones to achieve sustainable peace. The other part of the core needs to be the ones who have power to support the local interest. In the implementation phase, the core can be developed from international actors but locals should be adopted as soon as possible.

7.2 Argued presentation of the organigram

This section introduces examples of how the ideas presented earlier can be adapted into the organization. The ideas are core establishment, voluntary interaction, evolving structure and education.




Figure 28: Operation's generic core⁵

By conducting a stakeholder analysis, one can define the stakeholders who need to be in the core. In a generic sense, the United Nations, local union, NATO, local political elite, local governmental organizations, local non-governmental organizations, conflict parties and spoilers can be included. The generic core is presented in Figure 28. The one in command is the strongest international union or the local administration. One idea implemented into the core is to support local capacity building from the early stages. By this, the stakeholders who shall carry the responsibility in the end are considered. It also aims to develop their capabilities in the sense of mentoring and liaising. Coning (2012, 310) argues that significant

⁵ The example time is based on following calculations. UN has had 69 operations to date. 16 of those are ongoing. Average length of the ended operations is 3.5 years. When counting only the ones that have ended after the year 2000 the average length is 6 years. The average of the 11 ongoing 4-5th generation operations is 10 years and they are still ongoing. (United Nations, 2013a)

change in command structure needs to be done when the situation evolves from pacification towards state building.

The second idea is to support the transformation of the the warring factions into political parties, which can be comprehended to be a part of the demobilization process. The third idea is to mitigate the powerful stakeholders who have a negative attitude towards the peace process. For instance, the spoilers create a risk for the success and therefore they need to be addressed as soon as possible. The fourth idea is that the core can be established in many levels of the organization e.g. on regional and provincial levels.

Voluntary interaction is based on the will of the stakeholders to contribute. The interaction can have different levels from unity to competing (Coning & Friis 2011, 253–261). The stakeholders should be treated in a way that the competitive relations decrease. Figure 29 introduces a model to understand the voluntary-based thinking. It merely shows examples of the relations and it should be interpreted so that the end of the arrow shows the stakeholder's attitude at the starting point. All the operational lines have a core which is connected to the other stakeholders. Voluntary interaction enables the organizations to be dynamic by nature. The arrows can also be understood to be information flows. In that case, an information system should be adapted to support the information flow. The principle is that everything should be accessible to everyone since information adds to the level of interaction and to the overall understanding. This is suggested to be a topic for a new study.




Figure 29: Voluntary interaction and information flow

The state level organization is introduced in Figure 30. The idea is that the state level is managed by the core and supported by the ones capable and willing. To support the understanding of main objectives, the state-wide stakeholders are suggested to participate on regional levels as well. This does not mean that all the stakeholders need to be identical on different levels. The need of certain stakeholders can also vary between regions and based on the environment and the situation. The state level organization can be understood to be an adaptive division structure which utilizes networks. If the regions are identical the division structures resemble each other but the network is based on the actors available.




Figure 30: State level organization

On a regional level, the operational lines are presented and each of them has a member in the management core. Individual lines develop their own cores and networks surrounding them. Features of the matrix organization can be delivered, for instance, through evaluation and logistics. To support the self-emerging of the networks, an information flow must be supported internationally by technical means and capabilities.




Figure 31: Regional level organization

The overall organization suggestion is presented in Figure 32. It does not consider the levels of interaction but merely describes the command and reporting hierarchy. The overall idea of the networks is not described as a whole. The network can be utilized from the state level to the local level. For instance, the state level management core can use stakeholders within the network to support the evaluation and planning work. It is good to understand that actors within the network are not necessarily interested in regions or other geographical areas since province, region or district boundaries tend to be invisible and they can function on both sides.




Figure 32: Organization chart for the operation

The idea of networks is that all the parties accessing the information can voluntarily contribute to it. The stakeholder does not need to be tied into any specific action. It can contribute to reaching the main objectives by participating into projects designed to support the main objectives in the first hand.

To clarify the idea of local level actors, Figure 33 was created. An actor needs to be responsible to achieve commonly decided objectives. That actor is positioned into the management area. A security core should be established of the most influential people in the area in relation to all the actors. Both these groups have embedded mentors and trainers. The security actors are the actual executors of the tasks. The network is formed of every stakeholder that can be utilized to achieve objectives more efficiently.




Figure 33: Organization for the local security operations

8 Conclusions

This section presents the main findings of the thesis and the need for follow-up studies and presents an estimation of the reliability and validity of this thesis.

8.1 Findings of the Study

Peace operations terms

Many terms related to peace operations exist. The terms vary based on the organization studied. Some of the terms differ but, basically, they are trying to achieve similar issues. The term *peace operation* should include all the aspects of delivering sustainable peace into a selected state from planning to evaluating the actions. This is the reason why it was used in this thesis. Other terms such as *peace enforcement*, *peacekeeping*, *peace building*, *peace support operations*, *hybrid operations*, *integrated operations*, *multi-dimensional operations* and *comprehensive approach to operations* are describing a more specific event or a way to implement an operation.

Organizational factors supporting cohesion

The access to information is a crucial part of working towards common strategic objectives. When stakeholders are within an information sharing community, they have access to contributing to the operation as well as sharing their information and resources when interested. Core stakeholders, i.e. the ones having power and interest together with the ones whose capability should be built, should be within the information community as soon as possible. They should also contribute to it. Joint planning, implementing and evaluating actions will enhance the level of understanding the strategic objectives. By understanding, it is easier to see oneself as a part of the whole operation. Therefore, information is needed to reach a holistic approach and more efficiently perform as one.

Coning (2012, 106) argues that the assumption of a higher level of coherence is directly related to flawed efficiency. It is seen to work until a certain level after which the effects are unpredictable. In this thesis, the possibility of unwanted outcomes is mitigated through voluntary-based interaction.

Stakeholders in operations

Each operation is unique. When starting the fact finding, it is important to recognize the stakeholders within the area. That is the only way to involve them in the operation. International organizations are usually the same everywhere. This refers to, for instance, the United Nations, NATO and regional unions such as EU and AU. The local and international stakeholders are the ones that need to be carefully considered. By understanding their

dynamics, the correct ones are more likely to be addressed. The stakeholders can be divided, for instance, based on their functions, their objectives and their geographical operation area or level. This thesis presented generalized stakeholders which should be divided into smaller groups in a real situation. For instance, local population can be divided based on their ethnicity, religion or living area. Only after thorough recognition, can they be assessed and understood.

Applying stakeholder analysis to organization building

Previously, analyzing stakeholders has been used in assessments done after or during the crisis. In this thesis, it was used as a tool to recognize the stakeholders to be involved in the operational lines of peace operations. After recognizing the stakeholders, some analysis has to be done. A stakeholder analysis was deemed to be one useful application. By finding the ones with suitable capabilities towards the operational lines, one can establish a core group for the operation. The analysis should be revised from time to time to make sure the correct stakeholders are involved.

Key issues in building up the organization

It is important that the organization evolves according to the changes in the environment and in the situation. The structure itself is less important and it should be based on need and therefore on the mandate. Core stakeholders should be present in as many levels as possible to support the overall understanding of the strategic objectives. It can be argued that the closer to the root level the stakeholders are operating the more the operation's organization should be based on self-emerging and voluntary based communities and networks.

8.2 Need for Follow-up Studies

Success Factors of 21st Century Peace Operations

The first recognized need for a follow-up is a reproduction of Stedman's study. Since the operations are more complex today than they were prior to the new millennium, the current operations should be evaluated the same way. The outcome would be an assessment of operations between 2000–2016 to better understand the factors of complex operations and their negative and positive drivers. Simultaneously, it could be assessed whether the operations have been successes or failures.

Pre-mission training in support of all-stakeholder cohesion in Peace Operations

the second suggestion is related to the joint training. Based on the findings of this study, one can argue that pursuing common objectives needs interaction, mutual respect and knowledge of each other. The better the stakeholders know each other the easier it is for them to

interact. This can be supported by pre-mission training. In optimal situations, the people deployed to operations should be trained together. The suggested research task is to plan how a multi-stakeholder pre-mission training should be conducted in order to support the achievement of common objectives in the mission area.

Comprehensive Information Concept in Peace Operations

The third suggestion is about the information flow. It has been argued that information adds interaction and enables objective achievement. The suggested research tasks would be to define the requirements and develop a concept for the system. Also, technical aspects could be studied. This would be a potential way to support the information flow. Aspects to be included in the study could be the needed devices, possibilities to use crowd funding in project implementations and information management as a whole. For instance, the system could be application-based so that it is downloadable on application markets and devices would be easily available.

8.3 Reliability and Validity

As mentioned earlier, the data was collected from literature, survey and interviews. The literature used was mainly published peer-reviewed articles which are considered to be valid. The ones which were a thesis were gotten permission from the author to be used and giving them a chance to evaluate the parts utilized in this thesis. In some rare cases, secondary sources were used but those are always mentioned. The survey data on rounds 1–3 was studied by manual content analysis and by text mining tools. By using two ways the results are more reliable. Rounds 4–5 were based on numeric information but the number of respondents was too small to use statistical methods. Therefore, only averages were calculated and they were used to establish a general idea of the answers. The data collected was triangulated to reach valid information. The organization structure was not tested in practice but all the participants of the survey and interviews were given a possibility to comment on it. They did not express differing opinions towards the argued principles.

The used literature was up to date and versatile. The survey deserves some critique, however. Most respondents were from Finland and had a background from governmental or international organizations. All the stakeholder groups were not present. The respondents had a vast experience of the theme but more valid results would have been reached through a larger number of respondents from more versatile backgrounds. The interviews and information reviews were done by globally acknowledged professionals. Even though the thesis was done in cooperation with the IECEU project, their study data was used only to strengthen the idea that a lack of cooperation is a current and a major issue. Their assessment on the ways to improve the capabilities was not used. Therefore, this report can be seen as a separate study which possibly strengthens or weakens the IECEU project findings.

By conducting this study using qualitative content analysis, the results can be contested. It is possible that some other group would have analyzed the data differently or another respondent group might have answered differently. Thus, when using the collected data of this thesis it can be argued that the developed knowledge is valid due to the triangulation and fact finding. The knowledge developed can be used to train professionals more efficiently to widen their understanding on comprehensive system approach to peace operations.

Since, in the case of state-building, the situation is complex, it cannot be argued that the suggestions of this thesis would work in all the circumstances. As Coning (2012, 290) argues, some states are neither capable of maintaining nor achieving sustainable peace by themselves. The outcome of this thesis was to give a generic idea on how an organization can be developed to support the objectives and, especially, to support the interaction of the stakeholders. In the best case, this will contribute to the overall interaction and lessen the ineffective use of resources.

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Appendix 1: Introduction of Survey Respondents and Interviewees

Identification number	Gender	Age	Experience in time	Description of Experience	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5
1	Male	51–60	Related experience 6–10 years	International Organization	X	X	X		
2	Male	51–60	Related experience 6–10 years	International Organization	X	X	X		
3	Male	51–60	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X	X	X	X	X
4	Male	51–60	Related experience 6–10 years	International Organization	X	X	X	X	
5	Male	51–60	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X				
6	Female	41–50	Related experience 6–10 years	International Organization	X	X			
7	Male	51–60	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization	X	X	X		
8	Male	31–40	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X				
9	Male	51–60	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization	X		X		
10	Male	41–50	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization	X	X	X	X	X
11	Male	61–70	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X	X		X	X
12	Female	41–50	Related experience 2–5 years	International Organization	X				
13	Male	31–40	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X	X			
14	Male	41–50	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization	X	X	X	X	X
15	Female	31–40	Related experience 2–5 years	International Organization	X	X		X	X
16	Male	51–60	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization	X	X			
17	Male	46–50	Related experience 11+ years	Governmental Organization		X		X	X
18	Male	46–50	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization		X			X
19	Male	51–60	Related experience 2–5 years	International Organization			X		
20	Female	21–30	Related experience 2–5 years	Governmental Organization				X	
21	Male	41–50	Related experience 6–10 years	Governmental Organization					X
22	Female	51–60	Related experience 2–5 years	International Organization					X

Compiled back-ground of respondents:

Combination		Number
Gender	Males	17
	Females	5
Age group	21–30	1
	31–40	3
	41–50	5
	51–60	10
	61–70	1
Experience years	Related experience 2–5 years.	10
	Related experience 6–10 years.	11
	Related experience 11+ years.	1
Description of exp.	International Organization	8
	Governmental Organization	14
	Non-Governmental Organization	0
Participant in survey	1st Round	16
	2nd Round	14
	3rd Round	9
	4th Round	8
	5th Round	9

Appendix 2: Survey introduction and collected data

Introduction

Survey was conducted within the year 2016. It consisted of 5 rounds which all had two parts. The first part was about the basic information of the respondents and the second was about a selected theme. The questions are introduced below. The basic information and some other repeating parts are shown only once when first appeared.

The raw data which is not presented in the sections is introduced after the questions. This appendix contains the data for rounds 4 and 5.

Questions presented in the survey

Comprehensive Crisis Management - First Round

Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish first round is 5–10 minutes. Note that the basic information will be collected only once during this study.

Contact Information

Only anonymous information will be shared. Your answer can not be connected to your name unless you especially give us a license to do so in question number 7.

1. Fill in your contact information.

This will be used to inform you about the phase of the study.

First name *, Surname *, Phone, E-mail *

2. Please point out more experts for our study.

Experts are to have experience on the field of Comprehensive Crisis Management. Fill in a name and e-mail / row.

Example:

Name 1, e-mail 1

Name 2, e-mail 2

Basic information

3. Fill in your gender. *

Female, Male

4. Fill in your age *

21–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–60, 61–70, 71–80, 81–

5. Nationality *

□□

6. Which of the following internet services do you use? *

We will invite you into a group, where you can see the anonymous answers given and comment on them. Note that other group members will see your participation. If you do not want to be invited into the group select the last option.

Facebook, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Other, I will participate only to an anonymous group, I do not want to be invited

7. I allow my name being mentioned in the discussion forum established for the study and in the final report. *

I allow my name being mentioned, I do not allow my name being mentioned.

8. I allow my name being connected to the answer that I have given in the discussion forum established for the study and in the final report. *

I allow my name being connected to my answer., I do not allow my name being connected.

9. Fill in your expertise.

Fill in the tasks that have given you the most expertise in terms of Comprehensive Crisis Management. Maximum of four pieces.

For Example: COUNTRY, TIME, TASK

1. *, 2., 3., 4.

10. Choose one of the following options that best describes your field of expertise. *

Non-Governmental Organization (Fill in the name)

Governmental Organization (Fill in the name)

International Organization (Fill in the name)

Other (Fill in the name)

Defining Comprehensive Crisis Management

11. What does Comprehensive Crisis Management mean to you? *

□□

12. What does Comprehensive Approach mean to you? *

13. What should be the end-state of a Comprehensive Crisis Management operation be in your opinion? *

Thank You for participating into the first round. We will soon inform you about the results and give you details to take part into the second round.

Comprehensive Crisis Management - Second Round


Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish this round is 5-10 minutes.

The 2nd round concentrates on the strategy of Crisis Management Operations. We assume that a need for an operation has been identified. We have excluded the decision making process involved in the establishment of an operation. With your support, we have defined some terms to accomplish this round.

Need for an operation:

Non-functioning society where individuals' basic needs are not being taken care of, there is no functioning administration and/or there is a need for international assistance.

Strategy and End-state are to be found in the Figure below.



12. Here you can comment on the defined Strategy and End-state if you wish.

13. What are the lines of operations (also called as lanes, elements, lines of operations or development etc.) of a Comprehensive Crisis Management Operation?

The idea is to divide the operation into lines/lanes/elements that best describe the different approaches to the situation.

We are not looking for the organizations participating, but the lines of actions/operations that should exist to reach the end-state.

Guidance:

We have given you 15 lines. You can write the ones exceeding 15 into the "additional lines". If you have less than 15 lines, then just leave the rest empty. You can write a short explanation after the actual line.

1st Line of Operation:, 2nd Line of Operation:, 3rd Line of Operation:, 4th Line of Operation:, 5th Line of Operation:, 6th Line of Operation:, 7th Line of Operation:, 8th Line of Operation:, 9th Line of Operation:, 10th Line of Operation:, 11th Line of Operation:, 12th Line of Operation:, 13th Line of Operation:, 14th Line of Operation:, 15th Line of Operation:,
Additional lines:□
□

Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible.

Comprehensive Crisis Management - Third Round

Third round concentrates on the risks of a Crisis Management Operation. We are looking for events related to the operation as a whole. The risks related to the lines of operations will be identified later. Remember that a risk can be a positive (opportunity) or a negative (threat) event.

12. Here you can comment on the defined Strategy and End-state if you wish.

If you have answered this during the second round, please continue to the next question. If you decide to answer this again we will add it to your previous answer.

ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:

Similar Figure as was presented above.

ADDED INFORMATION ENDS

□□

13. What are the most crucial risks (threats or opportunities) related to the crisis management operation?

Guidance:

Stay on the high level. We are looking for the events affecting the operation. We have given you 15 lines. You can write the ones exceeding 15 into the "additional lines". If you have less than 15 lines, then just leave the rest empty. You can write a short explanation after the risk and also give an example of the operation you have noticed this to happen.

1st Risk:, 2nd Risk:, 3rd Risk:, 4th Risk:, 5th Risk:, 6th Risk:, 7th Risk:, 8th Risk:, 9th Risk:, 10th Risk:, 11th Risk:, 12th Risk:, 13th Risk:, 14th Risk:, 15th Risk:, Additional Risk:

□□

Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible. After this round there will be a longer period before moving into the fourth round. We will let you know as soon as possible.

Comprehensive Crisis Management - Fourth Round

Fourth round concentrates on the principles of organization structure. We have collected factors from organization theories and literature related to peace operations which support the structure formulating. You will be presented claims which you should evaluate.

Terms used:

Organization refers to the agency (UN, NATO, EU...) who is in the lead of implementing the operation. Stakeholders refers to all the agencies (NGOs, IOs, GOs) supporting the peace process.

12. A. Importance and B. occurrence of an individual factor or principle. *

Question A importance.

- 1 = Irrelevant
- 2 = Minor importance
- 3 = Medium importance
- 4 = Very important
- 5 = Extremely important

Question B. Occurrence:

- 1 = Never occurs
- 2 = Rarely occurs
- 3 = Sometimes occurs
- 4 = Often occurs
- 5 = Always occurs

Options

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Pass

- 1.A. Importance: Clear strategy connects all the actions.
- 1.B. Occurrence: Clear strategy connects all the actions.
- 2.A. Importance: Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down.
- 2.B. Occurrence: Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down.
- 3.A. Importance: High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders.
- 3.B. Occurrence: High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders.
- 4.A. Importance: High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders.
- 4.B. Occurrence: High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders.
- 5.A. Importance: Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common understanding of high level objectives.
- 5.B. Occurrence: Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common understanding of high level objectives.
- 6.A. Importance: Local ownership is ___ (Your answer).
- 6.B. Occurrence: Local ownership ___ (Your answer).
- 7.A. Importance: The organization is built on the principles of the host nation.
- 7.B. Occurrence: The organization is built on the principles of the host nation.
- 8.A. Importance: Host nation capacity building is ___ (Your answer).
- 8.B. Occurrence: Host nation capacity building ___ (Your answer).
- 9.A. Importance: Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible.
- 9.B. Occurrence: Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible.
- 10.A. Importance: The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment.
- 10.B. Occurrence: The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment.
- 11.A. Importance: The organization evolves during the operation.
- 11.B. Occurrence: The organization evolves during the operation.
- 12.A. Importance: The stakeholders perform as one.
- 12.B. Occurrence: The stakeholders perform as one.
- 13.A. Importance: Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives.
- 13.B. Occurrence: Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives.
- 14.A. Importance: Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries.
- 14.B. Occurrence: Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries.
- 15.A. Importance: Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries.
- 15.B. Occurrence: Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries.
- 16.A. Importance: Communities are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 16.B. Occurrence: Communities are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 17.A. Importance: Strategic alliances are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 17.B. Occurrence: Strategic alliances are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 18.A. Importance: Networks are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 18.B. Occurrence: Networks are ___ (Your answer) to success.
- 19.A. Importance: Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders.
- 19.B. Occurrence: Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders.

- 20.A. Importance: Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders.
20.B. Occurrence: Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders.
21.A. Importance: Follow-up is a/an ____ (Your answer) part of all actions conducted.
21.B. Occurrence: Follow-up ____ (Your answer) as a part of all actions conducted.
22.A. Importance: Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders.
22.B. Occurrence: Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders.
23.A. Importance: Each superior has a specific task.
23.B. Occurrence: Each superior has a specific task.
24.A. Importance: Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports to.
24.B. Occurrence: Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports to.

13. You can give your comments on the factors. Please refer to a number if possible. Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible.

Comprehensive Crisis Management - Fifth Round

Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish this round is 10-20 minutes.

Fifth round concentrates on stakeholder's power and interest to affect the aspects of crisis management. The assumption is that the stakeholder has decided to participate. We understand that the environment is always different.

You are to evaluate the power and interest based on your experience. It should present your view of the stakeholder performing at its realistic best. e.g. United Nations cannot use all the resources in one mission but the idea is to give a direction of what it could realistically be. Please take look at the Figure below to understand the idea and outcome. The ones benefitting of unstable situation are often referred as spoilers.

12. What is the power and interest related to Security and Rule of Law of a certain stakeholder

(Security and Rule of Law: providing security for groups and individuals. Functional justice and law enforcement systems.)


Some guidance:

- List refers to the list on the left. Fourfold is the picture on the right.
- The stakeholders will be automatically added into the fourfold starting from "1. United Nations" and ending to "20. Spoilers - International/Foreign" when you click a position in the fourfold. The next stakeholder to be positioned will be marked grey in list.
- If you misplaced a stakeholder it can be repositioned by clicking the stakeholder and clicking the fourfold again.
- If you wish to pass a stakeholder just click the next suitable stakeholder in the list.
- If you wish to find the stakeholders from the map and the number is not clear you can always click the stakeholder list and it will be shown red in the fourfold.

ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:

Each 20 stakeholders were estimated to be related to all the operational lines. Stakeholders and the fourfold will be shown only related to the first question.

ADDED INFORMATION ENDS



13. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:

Each 20 stakehodlers were estimated related to all the operational lines. The operational lines and the question related will be shown below. Neither the fourhold nor the stakeholder list is presented again.

ADDED INFORMATION ENDS

14. What is the power and interest related to Governance and Political System of a certain stakeholder.

(Governance and Political system: managing issues of common concern and delivering basic services. Possibility to elections.)

15. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

16. What is the power and interest related to Human Rights of a certain stakeholder.

(Human Rights: educating, respecting and monitoring of Human Rights.)

17. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

18. What is the power and interest related to Humanitarian aid of a certain stakeholder.

(Humanitarian Aid: emergency services and recovery services related to health, nutrition, shelter and supporting refugees and internally displaced persons.)

19. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

20. What is the power and interest related to Development and Economics of a certain stakeholder.

(Development and Economics: construction of infrastructure and facilitating economic growth.)

21. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

22. What is the power and interest related to Media and Civil Society of a certain stakeholder.

(Media and Civil Society: supporting the information flow and formation of interest groups.)

23. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

24. What is the power and interest related to Management of a certain stakeholder.

(Management: overall management and leading of the actions.)

25. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you assess to be necessary for this theme.

Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible.

THIS ENDS THE QUESTIONS

Appendix 3: Introduction to the risk identification and root reason assessment

The risk assessment process used is introduced in this appendix. The aim was to find potential failure factors for the strategic objective. After recognizing the factors, they were mitigated in the organization structure where possible. The list below describes the process step by step.

1. Risk Identification by professionals (Survey round 3, Appendix 2)
2. Risk categorization by author is presented in Figure 34.

Planning phase		Implementation		Cooperation	
Vague or missing common goal or end state.	Imbalance btw political mission statement and Real resources	Misbehavior of own troops/personnel	Lack of cultural sensitivities.	Lack of unity of effort between different actors (e.g. Military and civilian.	Key Leader Engagement
Non-capable mission senior leadership; including strategic guidance.	Lack of time to reach the end state	High level personnel / staff rotation	Control level of Opposing forces	New strategic actors entering the scene with their own agenda	Regional approach (opportunity)
Insufficiently, not well, drafted mission mandate (objectives and capabilities do not meet).	Weak long-term economic planning	Micro-management by the CPCC (risk).	Weak active presence	No unity of effort between participating nations.	Donor cooperation (opportunity)
The history and political dimensions are not well known.	Too ambitious objectives, goals.	Staffing (professionalism, availability) challenges.	Weak situational awareness	Lack of capacity building	Central warehouse (opportunity)
External vs internal vision and willingness mission differences	Too optimistic aims	Slow deployment and procurement procedures (risk)	Weak DDR and SSR process	No information sharing	Cooperation with the EUEI (both threat and opportunity)
Long term objectives and sustainability of results not thought well enough in the planning phase.	Bad planning	Cultural misunderstanding btw various actors	Freedom of Movement	Facilitation level of foreign aid	Guard force from the EUMS (opportunity)
The most crucial risks are already in the planning phase i.e. before crisis management (mission, operation) is launched. Bad planning leads to ill-defined mandate which hampers the whole mission. It is difficult to remedy planning phase mistakes, wrong assumptions, which are part of the mandate by operational activity on the ground.	Lack of advisors with good enough strategic planning capability	Too big military foot print. Building up the military bases and infrastructure often takes most of the transportation resources hampering humanitarian work. It may also disrupt the local economy when Western military forces buy both work force and goods from the civilian markets, causing price inflation and lack of skilled work force for local organisations and NGO's.	Mission creep	Lack of absorption capability	
Wrong time table. Western politicians want fast results which is not possible. Instead of big budgets for short time there should be smaller budgets for longer period of time. This would also force the locals to create their own activities and admin. instead of relying on foreign money.		Setting up a secure enough compound quickly enough (risk, EUBAM Libya)			
Development	Coordination	Host nation support	Insurgency and crime	Context changes	Other
No link with development and capacity building in that country - lack of holistic view.	Lack of coordination with local government	Host nation not cooperating	Violence	Peace agreement achieved/broken	Natural disaster (pandemic, flood, drought)
Economical development (jobs)	Lack of coordination	No political support from the host nation	Organized crime rate (trafficking)	Counterparts are not able to take political decisions needed (EUBAM Libya)	Return, resettle, repatriate refugees / IDPs
Weak Role of Law (ROL) capacity building	Weak liaison with all parties	Mental state of local people	Security concerns limit operational possibilities (EUBAM Libya)	Political disturbances in the region (neighboring countries)	Ignoring gender issues
Monitoring, mentoring, advising, training possibilities	Lack of coordination with other relevant stake-holders	Change in the population support to the host nation political leadership	Terrorism activity	Significant changes in the operational environment - not permissible for conducting crisis management as defined in the mandate.	Awareness campaign about women's rights
Weak Health Care	Nations have own aims	Establishing flow of Humanitarian Aid	Ignoring human rights		Media
Hand over all assigned responsibilities		Lack of public awareness raising - why the operation is going on and the results.	Humanitarian principles are not respected		Local Media statements (STRATCOM)
Getting the local administration to work. Locals have to learn to do their business and take care of themselves. Training and educating a functioning civil administration is vital. If local security forces take all the skilled work force because they are paid better, the administration will stay under skilled and corrupted.		TIME to gain results that benefit local population. The population is normally fed u with the conflict and wait fast benefits that raises their quality of life. If we succeed, we win the populations support. If it takes too much time, it gives opportunity to the "enemy" to gain support among the population.	Corruption		

Figure 34: Risk categorization

3. Root cause analysis by the author
 - a. The author has the overall analysis as a separate file but an example is provided below in Figure 35.




Figure 35: Example of root cause analysis on Cooperation and Coordination category

4. Analyzing the root causes and the risks related.

- a. A total of 46 risks were identified and 30 of them were related to stakeholders having own interests. The rest of the relations is introduced in Figure 36.
- b. For example, their own interest can be mitigated in some extent. This is done by joint planning, acting and information flow. This is assessed to enable a better understanding of the strategic objectives and the overall situation. This possibly contributes to the level of cooperation.

Risk	Total risks related
Own interests	30 out of 46
Lack of training	28 out of 46
Situation is not understood thoroughly	24 out of 46
Will to solve situation rapidly	19 out of 46
Cautiousness towards actions	17 out of 46
Multicultural environment	15 out of 46

Figure 36: Amount of risks related to root causes

5. Implementing mitigations into organization structure where possible.